Okay.

Are we on the record?

We are on the record.

Okay.

Today is Friday, January 9th, 2026.

I am the hearing officer, uh, Tim Pack.

Uh first item on the agenda is the approval of the minutes from our September 23, 2025 meeting.

I have reviewed those minutes.

Uh I approve those minutes.

Next item on our agenda is the uh the 12 uh 12640 South Relation Street appeal um filed by the IRS.

Did I say that right?

Yeah.

Air.

I apologize.

By the airs.

Okay.

Are we ready to proceed?

Okay.

Well, um, it's your appeal.

I invite you to the podium and make your presentation.

I have reviewed all the materials.

I might have some questions for you.

This is awkward too big.

Uh were you is that what you were doing?

That's what I was trying to do, but whatever your yeah, I'd love to say your next man.

That's whatever you're more comfortable with.

I understand.

And if there's something you want me to look at, all the materials are I have a screen here, whatever is up there.

Great.

We can put anything up.

So understanding that, if you as I go through this, if there's anything that you have questions on, please feel free to stop me and we can discuss and open it up further.

Okay.

We address the city's appeal response and the zoning administrators' interpretation based on the existing records.

The points below are rebuttal explaining why the city's reasoning cannot be sustained under Draper's Code and Utah Administrative Law Review.

As stated in the city's error appeal response in section 3A, quote, the appellant must show that the zoning administrator's interpretation was arbitrary and capricious, which means a failure to meet the substantial evidence standard.

To demonstrate that the administrator's interpretation was arbitrary arbitrary and capricious, failure to meet substantial evidence standard or stated differently, lacking a rational basis and failing to consider relevant factors, and is the legal standard used to challenge administrative agency actions.

I will be presenting three points.

The subdivision approval as implemented did not satisfy those standards and should not have been approved in its current form.

Therefore, the parcel's lawful classification should remain interior lot status unless and until the city identifies a code mechanism that lawfully converts it while satisfying Title 17's mandatory standards.

Uniform application.

The requested relief here is given the city's interpretation was arbitrary and capricious.

We are requesting that the corner lot determination not be sustained and that the parcel be treated and recorded as an interior lot with interior lot setbacks.

That is 30 feet front on Relation Street, 12 foot side yards, and 20 foot rear, and that the city's classification be reflected consistently in city records and aligned with county records so the property can be reasonably improved.

Under DCMC section 9-5-180 D4, the question is whether the interpretation is supported by substantial evidence and whether it correctly applies the code's plain meaning when the code is read as a coherent whole, not in isolated fragments.

Appellants do not appeal the determination that the parcel and structure are legally non-conforming.

This is a code interpretation appeal, not a dispute over physical facts.

To discuss section 3A of the city's air appeal response under DCMC Section 9-5-180-D4, the hearing officer decides this appeal based upon the record only and determines whether one, the record contains substantial evidence for essential findings, and two, the zoning administrator correctly interpreted interpreted and applied the land use regulations.

In its response to our appeal, the city cites outfront media LLC versus Salt Lake City Corporation 2017 Utah 74, paragraph 12.

There, the Utah Supreme Court distinguishes two separate bases for reversal.

One, a decision is illegal if it rests on an incorrect incorrect interpretation or application of the law, and two, a decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, this appeal focuses on A, whether the interpretation correctly applies Draper's code when read as a whole, our first point, and B, whether the city's asserted corner lot rule can be supported by the record and applied consistently.

Our second point.

Before turning to our substance, I would like to note a concern with the city's presentation in the appeal response.

The city's written response was dismissive and at times condescending, implying our position barely merits consideration.

To be clear, we did not create this dispute.

We came here because the city itself created uncertainty, changed its position, and then asserted after the fact that the issue was supposedly clear all along, that this property has been a corner lot since 2000.

This matters because it highlights a problem with the city's argument.

The city cannot credibly claim the issue has been settled for decades while the city's own process reflects uncertainty and reinterpretation.

That is our third point.

We also note that the city's references in their appeal response to dictionary definitions and quote geometry do not resolve the legal question at hand.

For clarity, we do not dispute the parcel physically abuts the June Circle Corridor, the ordinary meaning of the word abut, or the geometric relationship between June Circle and Relations Street.

The issue is whether abutment alone compels corner lot classification when Draper's code is read as a whole, including the subdivision standards in Title 17.

I will now expand upon our three points.

The subdivision plot itself.

I got it in the folder, Jen.

You have it in the folder?

Okay.

Where's the plat map?

I think there's that division.

Oh, there we go.

Well, oh no, excuse me.

When you talk about the platinum, is this what you're referring to?

Is that correct?

That's what they cited in their response to our interpretation.

Okay.

Okay.

Um appellants agree that the plat did not reclassify the parcel.

However, the relevance of the 2000 approval arises from the city's own asserted theory that, quote, when June's circle was established in the plat, the subject property became a corner lot.

It is that asserted consequence, not the plat's direct applicability that is at issue.

Under the city's theory, the 2000 Baker's Co.

subdivision approval is treated as having converted the subject parcel from an interior lot into a corner lot, thereby triggering corner lot consequences that must be evaluated under Title 17.

If approval of the subdivision in 2000 converted the subject parcel from an interior lot into a corner lot, then that subdivision approval necessarily imposed new dimensional, new dimensional and developability consequences on the parcel.

Under the Draper City Code, such a conversion could not lawfully occur without satisfying the mandatory standards applicable to corner lots.

Title 17 expressly requires that one corner residential corner lots be platted wider to accommodate increased setbacks.

That's found in the DCMC section 17-5-020 F.

And two, subdivision approvals result in lots that are developable and capable of reasonable improvement.

That same section in paragraph A.

The Baker's Cove subdivision approval did not widen the parcel.

It did not reconfigure it, and it did not ensure that it remained developable if treated as a corner lot.

If the city's current position is accepted, the subdivision approval created a non-conforming, impractical, and undevelopable corner lot condition.

An outcome Title 17 does not permit.

In that circumstance, the appropriate conclusion is not that the parcel must now be treated as a corner lot by operation of law.

Rather, the city's theory exposes a fundamental defect.

If the 2000 subdivision approval produced a result that converted the subject parcel into a corner lot, then the subdivision should not have been approved in that form without complying with Title 17's mandatory corner lot and developability standards, including preserving the subject parcel as a conforming interior lot through an appropriate access configuration.

The city identifies no provision of the code that permits an automatic conversion of a parcel's classification while bypassing those requirements.

Accordingly, the assertion that the parcel, quote, became a corner lot when June Circle was approved, does not resolve the appeal.

It underscores the problem.

Either the subdivision approval failed to comply with Title 17 at the time it was granted, or the parcel was never lawfully converted into a corner lot.

In either case, the city's current interpretation cannot be sustained.

The city cannot rely on the 2000 action to impose new corner lot consequences today while simultaneously avoiding the governing standards by asserting that, quote, what done is what's done is done.

Either the conversion was lawful under the code or it cannot be used now.

The city has suggested in their rebuttal to our appeal that the parcel is developed simply because a structure exists upon it.

This, however, misunderstands the purpose of Title 17 and legal nonconformity protections.

Title 17 does not exist merely to allow a lot to remain occupied indefinitely.

It exists to ensure that lots remain capable of reasonable improvement over time.

A rule that deems a parcel developable solely because an aging structure happens to sit on it, effectively freezes the property in time, treating the existence of an old structure as in a reason to deny any reasonable improvement and preventing reconstruction, modernization, or reasonable redevelopment without any change in zoning, plating, or physical conditions.

That is precisely what nonconformity protections are designed to prevent.

Draper City Code does not authorize interpretations that lock a parcel into its existing condition and strip it of meaningful redevelopment potential decades after plat approval.

If the city's interpretation leaves the parcel usable only so long as the current structure remains untouched, that is not developable within the meaning of Title 17.

It is a regulatory dead end, and the interpretation still cannot be sustained.

Additionally, the city has also claimed the word abutment for reasons of their interpretation.

Yeah.

So I'm trying to understand your your your argument a little better.

Tim, can you speak in the mic?

Okay.

So you you raised uh chapter 17-5-020 subsection F corner lots.

Um is it your position that when this Baker's Cove subdivision was platted?

The city made a determination on whether your property was a corner lot or not.

So that is what the city itself has asserted in its appeal response that because this was platted, and at the time that it was platted, our lot automatically converted into a corner lot.

That's the entire basis of their argument.

Okay.

So before the I don't want to use terminology that the right of way, the path, the road, which is now June Circle.

Right.

Before it was platted, it was something else, right?

It was land.

It was just land.

It was no right of way.

Correct.

Okay.

And by your position is the result of this plat was to is it your position that this it automatically converted it to a corner lot?

That is what the city has stated.

That is not what we argued.

That was the basis for their interpretation.

Okay.

Um they are the ones that provided this plat in their interpretation response.

Okay.

And so to quickly summarize your position of why it's not a corner lot based on the Baker's Cove plat.

Because there was never anything done to lawfully convert it from the interior lot to a corner lot.

Okay.

There was no the city has provided no mechanism to show why it has how it converted from an interior lot to a corner lot, and when this when the plat was established, there was no review done as to the implication or consequences upon our lot status at the time.

And I understand the city's position is that there was no formal determination that your lot was a corner lot as of as of the time of the Baker's Cove plat.

But because of the Baker's Cove plat, it had the effect of turning your lot into a corner lot.

Is that is that your understanding of the city's position?

Correct.

Do I have that correct?

That's what they have stated.

Okay.

Okay.

Continue, sorry.

Great, no problem.

Thank you for your questions.

The city has suggested also in their rebuttal to our appeal.

Oh, excuse me.

Additionally, the city has also claimed the word abutment as reasoning for their interpretation.

Um abutment is conceded by the appellants.

The question is whether abutment alone compels corner lot classification without reconciling the result with Title 17's mandatory standards.

The city's argument rests almost entirely upon the one word of abutment.

The city says that because our parcel abuts June Circle, and because June Circle meets the broad definition of a street, the parcel must automatically be a corner lot.

That reasoning is flawed because abutment alone has never been sufficient to determine lot classification under Draper City Code.

If abutment alone were enough, then the city would be required to classify a wide range of parcels as corner lots simply because they touch or border something labeled a right of way.

This would include parcels that abut private access easements, utility corridors, paper streets, flag lot access lanes, shared private drives, and rights of way that provide no frontage addressing or access to the parcel itself.

Draper has never applied its code that way.

The issue is not whether the word abut can be read broadly in a dictionary as the city has stated.

The issue is whether the city can read that road read that word so broadly that it nullifies other mandatory provisions in the code.

An interpretation that turns abutment into a universal trigger for corner lot status creates internal conflict within the ordinance and cannot be sustained under Utah law.

Abutment may be a necessary condition for corner lot, but it has never been a sufficient one.

And treating it as sufficient creates results the code was designed to prevent, which leads us into our second point of uniform application.

Excuse me.

I will next address our second point of uniform application or arbitrary or capricious action.

Utah administrative law requires consistent application of land use standards.

The city's effort to exclude similar similarly situated properties by arguing that they were not cited in the interpretation would improperly insulate inconsistent application from appellate review.

The city objects to the appellant's discussion of similarly situated properties on the grounds that those properties were not cited in the zoning administrator's interpretation and therefore must be excluded under DCMC Section 9-5-180 D 4.

The appellants do not dispute record-only review and do not offer the comparables as new factual evidence regarding the subject parcel.

Rather, the comparables are cited for a legally permissible purpose to evaluate whether the city's stated interpretation can be lawfully and uniformly applied.

Appellants agree on the governing rule.

This is a record-based appeal under DCMC 9-5-180.

We are not asking the hearing officer to accept new testimony, make new factual findings, or consider facts that were unavailable to the zoning administrator, but the city's position goes further than the code allows.

The restriction in 9-5-180 limits new facts, not legal argument.

An appellant is permitted, indeed required, to explain why an interpretation based on the existing record misapplies the code or produces an unlawful result.

Nothing in our appeal changes the underlying facts.

The parcel boundaries have not changed, the recorded plat has not changed, June Circle has not changed, the zoning code has not changed.

The only thing that changed was the city's interpretation.

What the city city labels as quote new evidence is simply our explanation of why their interpretation on its face fails to properly apply Draper City Code as a whole.

That is not legal analysis, that is legal analysis, not factual supplementation.

So I I understand your position.

If between new evidence versus legal argument.

Correct.

And I'm is that is that acceptable?

Fine.

I'm excited.

Okay.

So I'm not going to restrict in what you present today.

In my written ruling, I may say you presented something.

I'm going to accept it, admit it, or not.

Right.

Does that make sense?

Yes.

Okay.

So in response to that, even if you disregard and exclude the disputed evidence that we we've supported, or the excluding articles, excuse me, that we've submitted, this finding still fails on its face because it still fails to reconcile Title IX with Title 17.

Okay.

The city's position in excluding these facts in the administrative interpretation would effectively limit appellate review to only those facts and comparisons the zoning administrator themselves elected to discuss, thereby insulating inconsistencies from review by omission.

If accepted, the narrower a zoning administrator writes an interpretation, the narrower the scope of appeal, regardless of whether the city applies the same ordinance differently elsewhere.

Here, the city's interpretation asserts that adjacency to a right of way constitutes, quote, a street, and that, quote, when June Circle was established in the plat, the subject property became a corner lot.

The appellants' references to similarly situated properties test the legal consequence of that interpretation.

Whether Draper City has in practice treated right of way adjacency as automatically creating corner lot status and imposed dual 30-foot front setbacks on other properties elsewhere.

The record reflects that Draper City has not applied the rule in that manner to other recent approvals, including projects currently under construction.

An interpretation that appears to be applied flexibly in the context of larger development approvals, but rigidly when applied to an individual homeowner, raises a serious concern of unequal application, even absent any suggest of intention.

Such an outcome underscores why abutment alone cannot be dispositive and why the code must be applied uniformly to materially similar parcels regardless of the applicant.

In the appeal application, appellants identified multiple recently approved residential parcels that, under the city's own definition of street, similarly abut more than one right of way.

These examples are not offered to challenge those approvals or indeed to introduce new facts, but to test the city's interpretation for internal consistency.

Under the interpretation advanced here, each of those parcels would be required to carry dual 30-foot front setbacks as cornered lots.

The record reflects that they were not treated that way, yet were still approved for construction.

This contrast illustrates that the city has not, in practice, applied abutment alone as an automatic trigger for corner lot classification, reinforcing that the city's interpretation at issue reflects a novel and overly rigid application rather than the code's settled meaning.

Accordingly, consideration of similarly situated properties for purposes of evaluating arbitrariness does not constitute new testimony or new information about the subject parcel and falls within the hearing officer's responsibility to determine whether the interpretation reflects a lawful and consistent application of the code.

Stated plainly, if Draper applies corner lot rules differently to materially similar circumstances, then the asserted rule is not being applied consistently and cannot be sustained as non-arbitrary as ruled by the Utah Supreme Court in the city's own referenced case of Outfront Media LLC versus Salt Lake City Corporation 2017 Utah 74, paragraph 12.

The third and last point we will present today regards the city's conduct in reflecting that there has been no settled quote corner lot since 2000 designation.

Appellants acknowledge reasonable reliance is not determinative under DCMC Section 5-section 9-5-180 and do not offer it as in an independent basis for reversal.

It is relevant context for the city's claim that the parcel has been a corner lot since 2000.

The city asserts that one, the parcel became a corner lot when June Circle was approved in 2000, two, the issue was not ambiguous, and three, the remedy should have been pursued by a predecessor decades ago.

But if this had been truly settled for 24 years, the city would have consistently communicated corner lot setbacks, and there would have been no internal uncertainty, and there would have been no need for a formal interpretation now.

The record, however, reflects the opposite.

During pre-purchase due diligence, appellants architect and contractor both contacted the city to confirm buildability and setbacks.

On August 28th, appellants received a written message from the contractor relaying the setbacks provided to him by the city, stating, quote, here are a few things I got for you on that lot.

Total square foot of lot is 10,890 square feet, the front setback is 30 feet, rear setback is 20 feet, and the sides are 12 feet.

Those setbacks correspond to an interior lot, not a corner lot.

If the parcel were a settled corner lot, the city would have described dual front setbacks along both Relations Street and June Circle to the architect and contractor.

Quoting directly from the city's air appeal response.

Section 4A, the city's response quote, frontage does not determine whether a property is defined as a corner lot.

Plats do not identify corner lots.

The city does not create corner lots or intend to do so.

Corner lots are created when properties abut two intersecting streets in the manner described by the code, supra.

When June Circle was established in the plat, the subject property became a corner lot.

And two, Section 4 C, the city's own response, quote, the zoning administrator's interpretation does not clarify an unresolved ambiguity.

The subject property became a corner lot when June Circle was approved.

Over the nearly two and a half decades that have intervened, this is the first time either the appellant or the appellant's predecessor in interest has asked for an interpretation, end quote.

During due diligence before committing substantial architectural fees, appellant Jenna Eyre, myself, contacted the city to confirm the lot status in writing, specifically noting the property's relationship to relations street and June Circle.

If the corner lot status were settled, as the city claims in their rebuttal that I read above, it would have been readily ascertainable and communicated.

Instead, city staff and its director expressly expressed uncertainty and directed me to file an administrative interpretation in order to receive a formal answer.

Upon doing so, and in numerous conversations with the city planning and their director, it was revealed that internal views diverged between city planning officials and the city attorney in and three different stated deadlines in providing a ruling response to me were missed.

In fact, it took the city over a month to settle upon a decision as to whether the parcel was an interior or corner lot.

That sequence is inconsistent with the city's quote clear since 2000 narrative, and it supports our third point.

Appellants incurred substantial due diligence costs prior to purchase, have carried the capital costs of a vacant property for months, experienced delays in architectural and construction planning, and now face additional costs and time associated with this appeal.

More fundamentally, had the parcel been identified as a corner lot during due diligence, appellants would not have purchased it.

If the city's interpretation is sustained and the parcel is finalized as corner lot, the severely constrained building envelope will prevent reasonable modern residential development and materially diminish the property's value, resulting in further financial harm.

The interpretation does not correctly interpret and apply Draper City Code when read as a whole.

It treats abutment as dispositive.

It isolates Title IX definitions from Title 17's mandatory subdivision standards governing corner lot configuration and developability, and it yields a result that effectively freezes the parcel in its existing condition rather than preserving its ability to be reasonably improved, consistent with legal nonconformity protections.

It also assigns decisive consequences to the 2000 Baker's Cove action without identifying any code provision authorizing an automatic conversion to a corner lot while bypassing Title 17's requirements, and it advances a restrictive rule that cannot be applied coherently or uniformly in practice.

Accordingly, appellants respectfully request that the hearing officer not sustain the corner lot determination and instead confirm that the subject parcel is properly classified and recorded by the city and consistently and county records as an interior lot, subject to interior lot setbacks, which are a single 30-foot front yard setback from Relations Street, two 12 foot side yards, and a 20 foot rear setback, so that this property can be reasonably improved.

Thank you.

Okay.

A few follow-up questions.

So if we're just looking at the definition of corner lot in a vacuum.

Right.

I I read the definition as so a lot or parcel of butting two intersecting or intercepting intercepting streets.

So one of the issues is June circle a street.

Right.

Um the definition of street seems to be very broad.

Do you dispute that June circle is a street?

No.

No.

Not based on the code.

Okay.

Can you speak in the mic?

No, not based on the code.

Okay.

From what the code reads, it's saying that it is a street.

So according to the code, it's a street.

And the intersecting streets of relation street and June circle are less than 135 degrees.

Correct.

So you're and I don't want to.

But it essentially your argument is that the city effectively changed an interior lot to a corner lot and effectively made it a non-complying the home and non-compliant structure and the lot of non-compliant lot when they recorded the Baker's Cove play.

Is that the city has argued in their do you agree with that?

Like that's essentially what I understand.

You don't think it's a corner lot.

But that's okay.

Um mechanisms by which lot classifications can change.

There's been no plat reconfiguration, there's been no subdivision approvals because they themselves argue that this does not apply to our lot, that our lot was excluded, and yet they incoherently then argue it as the basis for their interpretation.

Um there is no zoning action and there's been no variance ruling.

Thereby there has been nothing provided that shows us how this was legally transformed from an interior lot into a corner lot, meaning it never was.

We have both done substantial research and can find none.

Okay.

And the first time that you're aware of that the city made a determination that it was a corner lot is the zoning administrator's recommendation or opinion.

That was quoted to me by Todd Draper that on his um on his suggestion that I submit an administrative interpretation because it was unclear to them as to how that lot was classified and that had never been classified within that within their jurisdiction.

Okay.

Thank you.

Or I can turn turn this way.

Um questions before you get started.

Um certainly.

So I I asked the question, uh when the Baker's Cove Plat subdivision was approved and recorded.

It's the city's position that that event had the effect of changing the status of the property from an interior lot to a corner lot.

That's right.

Okay.

And actually to go back to the question that you asked, if there's a legal mechanism, it would be impractical to create a legal mechanism for for changing interior lots into corner lots other than having the definition of our code apply as its plain language, meaning otherwise the city would be bogged down with going through every single lot and parcel in the city regularly trying to reclassify and follow through with a with a procedural umchanism to convert it.

So there's that's the reason why it's not, there's no mechanism within the Draper City Municipal Code to change a corner lot or to an interior lot to a corner lot.

It's just not a practical.

What's that?

It either is or it isn't, and a lot can change over time.

That's right.

It's it's it's by definition a corner lot if there are two streets intersecting or intercepting, that's the way our our code um reads that abut the law or parcel with with a degree of angle of 135 degrees or less.

Okay.

So here's kind of where I'm what's giving me pause is so the uh chapter 17 subdivision requirements for subdivision 1750 lots.

Talks uh subsection F talks about corner lots.

Corner lots for residential use should be platted 10 feet wider than interior lots in order to facilitate conformance with the required street setback requirements of the zoning ordinance.

Now I understand that when you're platting a subdivision, right?

This applies to the lots within that subdivision, not to lots but outside of that subdivision.

But what happens when the effect of recording this plat had the effect of transforming an interior lot to a corner lot, which doesn't comply with that requirement if it was part of the subdivision.

Yeah, so response to that is is several fold.

First, uh Title 17 is not considered within the zoning administrator's jurisdiction to hear matters of Title 17, it's matters of Title IX.

Title 17 wasn't raised in the original uh uh request for the zoning administrators' interpretation, and so for that reason I would object to any kind of inclusion of discussion of Title 17 in the same uh vein that it's new evidence.

Uh however, to address the issue of Title 17, Title 17 is uh required of the city to uh as an engineering standard.

Title 17 addresses our engineering standards.

Um our engineering department looks at PLTs and makes sure that they comply with what's in those uh what's what's in our engineering standards under Title 17, and then can only because the way that Title 17 reads can only apply those standards to the property that's included within the plat.

Uh they have to not consider property outside of the plat when they look at those standards.

Um the the owner of the parcel in question at the time that June Circle was created by this plat, um specifically left this parcel out.

They owned that parcel as well as all of the others that are in the Baker's Cove plat.

And so they specifically excluded their parcel for what reason?

I'm not sure.

But um assuming that in 2000, Title 17 read then as it does now.

Um that's a that's another problem that I have with applying Title 17 here, is because we're applying Title 17 as it's amended today to conditions that were in effect in in 2026 years ago, 25 years ago, which the code might have read differently.

There's no basis for us to know what the code read in 2000, other than if we go and look it up.

And that the code as it read in 2000 hasn't been brought forward as a basis for saying that the city's action was illegal then beyond that statute of limitations would have run on that claim by now.

Um and so let's just assume for argument's sake that we can use our code to apply to an action that happened in 2000, knowing that the subdivider was the owner of the appellant's property and the subdivider was the owner of all of the property within the plat.

Um we can we can only assume that they did this fully aware of what was going to happen to the property that the appellants are uh that that's the subject property today, um, and that they were fully aware of the legal consequences, or if they weren't that at the very least, they had every opportunity to um become informed of those consequences before they submitted the plat, and they did it anyway.

Okay.

If I've I've read your submission, but if you want to do some stuff, go ahead.

So the the city's argument is uh it goes to a plain language argument.

Um the uh Ludma requires that that jurisdictions read the plain language of their own code and of Ludma and apply that.

Um if we look at the definition of corner lot, the definition of corner lot reads that it's a lot or a parcel that abuts two streets with an intersecting or intercepting angle of 135 degrees or less.

And so while in the brief, I I mentioned uh geometry and math.

I understand it seems a little bit glib, it was mostly uh a dig at myself for being bad at math.

Um, but yeah, I'm bad at math, but I can see that it's less than 135 degrees just by eyeballing it.

But then I had our um GIS department draw a 135 degree angle and superimpose it on the map to show that it's less than 135 degrees.

Um, because our plain language argument is is there is there a parcel there?

Does the property of the parcel abut two streets do those streets intersect or intercept at an at an angle of less than 135 degrees?

If so, it's by definition a corner lot.

And if the corner lot in the if it's a corner lot, then it has to meet the corner lot setbacks.

Um June Circle is a street.

Um that is evidence here.

Can we zoom in here?

Let me zoom in here.

This is the plat.

We have this here listed as a right-of-way easement, and then we have June Circle here.

It says 12635 South Street, and then in parentheses in brackets there, private.

And if we look at the definition of do we have the code up here, Jen?

Now I'll pull it up.

Do you agree that was it was it was not a any type of street prior to the recording of the plat?

Prior to recording of the plat, it wasn't a street.

It was it was part of either the the parcel in question or the neighbor's parcel, um, which would have meant that at that time it was an interior lot.

Uh no argument from me that in 2000 before the plat was recorded and before the June circle was created, that would have been an interior lot.

But as soon as June Circle was created, now there are two streets.

Uh and you know, it may not have this may not have been the definition in 2000 either.

I'll I'll concede that, but as soon as we changed our um our ordinance to define a corner lot as one with two streets that abut the property, uh my argument is that's when it becomes a corner lot.

Um if not, you know, if there's if there's some argument for a legal non-conforming use, that would be another zoning administrator's interpretation.

So if the appellants want to come back and argue, well, in 2000, the code didn't say that this was what a corner lot was when the when the plat was approved, then you know we can look at the definition of what a corner lot was back in 2000, and then we can make a determination of whether there's a legal non-conforming use that's continued to this day.

Um that may or may not mean that the that the subject property is redevelopable because with legal nonconforming uses and legal non-conforming statuses, those can change based off of redevelopment.

Um but the city's argument is is the plain language argument, which uh has been required by um you know by by Utah Law as recently as uh within the context of uh land use development management act, uh Northern Monasetal Monticello Alliance versus San Juan County, which was in 22 or 23, that's still good law.

Um as for the the argument that um the city has failed to enforce or failed to look at other lots and and apply the same standards, um that doesn't necessarily make the decision today arbitrary and capricious.

Um arbitrary and capricious means that uh we can't meet the substantial evidence standard, and based off of the information that's included in the zoning administrators report, uh the substantial evidence standard can be met because a substantial evidence is uh let's see, I have it written down here.

I always get this wrong.

I can't recite it off the top of my head.

The quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.

It's not a very high bar that if there's enough evidence there to convince a reasonable mind to meet the same conclusion that this is a corner lot, I think that we can uh say that we've met our substantial evidence standard, and it's not arbitrary and capricious.

Whether we've enforced our corner lot standard and our corner lot setbacks against other properties in the city previously, um actually has no bearing on whether we can do so now.

There's a there's a case called uh well, there's a couple of cases.

There's the earliest case that I could find goes back to 1976, and it's Carchner versus Salt Lake County, where the court said that a municipality's uh failure to enforce an ordinance does not preclude it from enforcing an ordinance now.

Failure to enforce previously doesn't mean that you can't enforce it now.

Um and that was upheld as recently as twenty twenty three by Burmese versus Summit County.

So if we've failed to designate a lot or a parcel as a corner lot and treat it as a lot or a parcel, that's a corner lot in the past, that doesn't necessarily make our decision to identify this as a corner lot now arbitrary and capricious.

And um we are obligated to follow our own ordinance.

So when we get asked for a zoning administrator interpretation, what we need to do is we need to look at our own ordinance, read it in the plain language meaning of the ordinance, and then apply our ordinance so that uh we can come out with predictable um conclusions.

Um other than that, my my contention is under the plain language meaning of the term corner lot and the plain language meaning of street.

Um this is a corner lot, and uh the zoning administrator's decision was not incorrect in terms of calling it a zoning or a corner lot, and it should be upheld.

Do you have any other questions?

No, I don't.

Okay.

Um you have an opportunity to respond.

Well, let me ask, how much time do you think you need?

Is it more than five minutes?

I'd like to take a quick break.

Yes.

So can we take a take a five minute break?

Sure, yeah, go ahead.

Great.

Thanks for recording.

Sure.

Take your time.

Okay, I think we're ready.

Okay.

So I'll say this.

I'm not going to restrict to restrict your presentation in any way.

Um there is an ordinance which restricts what I can consider.

Um and so after I re-review that ordinance and look at the evidence, I may ultimately say, well, I I agree with you.

This is argument, this is legal argument, it's not new facts, not new evidence.

Uh or I may not, and then in my written ruling item, I'll say I'm I can't consider that.

Reserve that for after your review.

Right.

So I'm not going to restrict.

And I understand I will I will also say this though.

Um sometimes cities, counties um aren't consistent in their enforcement of their own code.

Um, and that is usually not a basis uh for having the city deviate from its own code in a different instance.

Understood.

But anyway, I'm I'm not going to restrict what you present.

Okay, thank you.

Excuse me, I am still recovering or in the midst of a very bad cold.

So we're gonna start this here.

Okay.

Um we first like to address Title 17 and the issue that the city has discussed.

It is not in fact new evidence.

Um you just pull that microphone out.

Yes.

Title 17 is not in fact new evidence as he is claiming.

It was cited in the original request for the zoning administrator's interpretation, and it was referenced in the city's own interpretation.

We will just show this was originally filing list title nine, title seventeen.

Then this was the interpretation where they discussed the concept of Title 17.

I I've seen the I've seen the references in Title 17.

Can I clarify something real quick?

Sure.

So the objection is not about it being new evidence.

The objection to Title 17 is that it's outside the scope of the authority giving to the appeals and variance hearing officer in Title 95.

What is it, 040?

Or one eight 180 or 170, I can't remember where it is.

But it's not inside, it's not for the appeals and variance hearing officer to consider uh the appeals and variance hearing officers titles of Draper City Municipal Code to consider are exclusively within Title IX.

And if it's an appeal from a zoning administrator's decision, a zoning administrator's decision uh to hear items comes exclusively in Title IX as well.

So Title 17 is outside the jurisdiction of both uh administrative bodies under the Draper City Municipal Code.

So, and I'm hesitant to make a final ruling on something like this, but my understanding is I big picture, right?

The question before me is really the question's simple, the answer is the more difficult.

Is is the property a corner law?

Right.

I think basically I think that's the only question I'm I'm I'm deciding.

Um that's an issue under Title IX.

Um the city has cited to Title 17.

Um, I'm gonna let you argue Title 17 and how that applies or relates to Title IX and how this is a corner law.

Sure, great.

I'm gonna you can do your thing.

We argue that Title 17 is not optional when the city relies on the 2000 approval, and the city cannot have it both ways.

It cannot argue that the parcel became a corner lot because of this subdivision, this Baker Cove approval, and then disclaim the standards that govern the legal consequences of that approval.

That's the fundamental flaw here.

If the city's theory is correct, then the 2000 action imposed new dimensional and developability consequences.

Title 17 expressly requires that corner lots be platted wider and that subdivision approvals result in lots capable of reasonable improvement, and none of that occurred here.

So the city can't argue and rely upon the baker's plat subdivision here and the baker's cove approval, and then deny it here in today.

The city identifies no code provision allowing an automatic conversion that has bypassing those requirements.

Title 17 matters because the city's own theory relies on the action as the event that allegedly converted the parcel into a corner lot.

If that action imposed new corner lot consequences, then those consequences must comply with the standards that govern subdivision outclock outcomes, including developability and corner lot configuration.

We are not challenging or reopening the Baker's Cove approval.

We are only responding to the city's reliance on it for their interpretation.

If the city invokes the action to impose new legal consequences today, it must accept the standards that accompany that action.

It must.

Otherwise, they cannot use the conversion to justify their response.

The city also addressed other the other properties.

We are not asking you to adjudicate other approvals.

The references are offered solely to test the city's interpretation for internal consistencies.

An interpretation that is applied differently to materially similar parcels raises a concern of administrability and uniform application under the code.

That is arbitrary.

That is what we agree with.

The subject part property does abut Relation Street and June Circle.

This definition is unambiguous.

Plats do not create or eliminate corner lots.

Corner lot status arises by operation of the code when streets are established.

When June Circle was approved in 2000, the subject property abutted two streets and became a corner lot at that time.

This is what the city's main statement argument means is saying.

Standards the city itself has adopted.

If the hearing officer also decides that the factual circumstances of the adjacent properties that we have submitted is also irrelevant.

Even if both of these are entirely set aside, and the only thing you look at is Title IX, the city's interpretation still fails under Title IX alone.

Under Title IX, the city must still identify a lawful mechanism by which this parcels classification changed.

To be clear, that lawful mechanism is a subdivision approval, a zoning action, a variance ruling, any of these are lawful mechanisms.

Otherwise, the city can willy-nilly go in and lay down pavement and change classifications of lots at will.

That is what the code expressly prevents and protects against.

Title IX defines terms, but it does not authorize automatic reclassification of lots without an implementing action or standard.

Even without Title 17, the city has already determined the parcel is legally non-conforming.

That status exists to prevent later interpretations from imposing new restrictions that eliminate reasonable redevelopment.

The interpretation does exactly that.

Anything else?

I'll just add one last comment, which is why are we here?

We asked the city before we bought the lot if it was a what the setbacks were.

And they told us it was an interior lot.

They gave us interior lot setbacks.

If they had have told us it was a corner lot from the very beginning, we wouldn't have bought the property.

We wouldn't be sitting here.

Now we're trying to develop this property.

We're gonna take it a very aged old home.

I'm not sure what the issue is now, but if they had a if this was a corner lot with dual setbacks, why didn't they tell us that before we bought the property?

Why didn't they tell?

Why didn't we just show because then none of us would be sitting here?

And and that old property can just sit as is forever here in Draper City rather than having somebody come through and improve it.

So at this point, if it is deemed a corner lot, it's gonna be impossible to develop on a 20-foot envelope, and we'll probably I don't know what we'll do at that point, but it definitely will decrease the value of that property.

Okay, I'd just like to close on again by emphasizing that this interpretation fails on every level.

It fails on Title IX alone, it fails on Title 17, and it fails on arbitrary and capricious action by the city.

For purposes of DCMC, section 95180, subsection D4, appellants have clearly met our burden.

The zoning administrator's interpretation is not supported by substantial evidence for its essential legal conclusion, and it does not reflect a correct interpretation and application of the land use regulations when read as a whole.

The interpretation treats abutment alone as dispositive.

It isolates Title IX definitions from the broader ordinance, and it fails to reconcile that reading with mandatory Title 17 requirements, governing corner lot configuration, developability, and legal nonconformity.

In doing so, it assigns decisive legal consequences to the 2000 Baker's Cope action without analyzing whether those consequences were lawful then or can be imposed now.

It produces a result that defeats the code's express protections for reasonable improvement, and it applies the most restrictive possible interpretation in a manner the city itself has not uniformly applied.

Even setting aside any contested exhibits, these defects are apparent on the face of the interpretation and the existing administrative record.

Because the interpretation's essential legal conclusion does not follow from the evidence cited and is incorrect under a proper plain meaning analysis of Draper City Code, the appellants respectfully request that the appeals and variance hearing officer reverse the corner lot determination and confirm that the subject parcel is properly classified as an interior lot, subject to a single front yard setback from relation street.

Thank you.

So you mentioned a few times Title 17 and how we can't just look at Title IX.

So when we look at Title 17, I know we've we've looked at the definition of corner lots, right?

And that has specific um setbacks.

Okay.

Is there any other provision or section of Title 17 other than that definition that you've been referring to?

I don't believe so.

Okay.

No, that was the that was the point that was in the uh original filing.

Yeah, section 17.5 or two oh.

Okay.

Um this is a this is an interesting issue.

Um I mean, you've I'm not making a ruling right now.

I'm gonna do a written a written ruling, and I haven't made up my mind yet.

Um, but I would say, you know, cities, counties, they change their land use code all the time, they change setback requirements, they change lot width requirements, they create all by themselves uh non-conforming lots, non-conforming structures.

It happens, right?

Um they have in general the the right right to do that, right?

Um cities and counties usually have mechanisms to sort of account for that, account for those they create inconsistencies and irregularities, right?

And there are also ordinances that account for that, and there's the non-conforming structure ordinance, nonconforming use uh uh ordinance, nonconforming lot ordinance, um there's variances, right?

There's the nonconforming structure ordinance, nonconformant use uh uh ordinance, nonconforming lot ordinance, um there's variances, right?

So sometimes these things happen, but there's sometimes ways to still achieve your goals, um, regardless of whether there's a determination this is a corner lot or not.

Um so today it's it's simply is this a corner lot?

I think.

Um I would say don't let that discourage you from continuing to do what you want to do with your property.

Okay.

Anything else from anybody?

Okay.

I don't think we have anything now from the city.

Did we make appearances?

Proper appearances?

Not really.

Should we do that now?

Yeah, yeah, let's do that.

Okay.

Um I made my appearance.

I'm Tim Pack, the hearing officer.

Um, starting with, can you state your names for the record?

Jenna Eyre.

Uh Michael Eyre.

Okay.

And and I'm Spencer Duchenne, assistant city attorney for the city, and I actually did make an appearance without being asked at the beginning.

Okay.

I remembered.

Jennifer Destromski, community development director.

Todd Raper, planning manager.

Uh Todd Taylor, planner.

Okay.

Lori Stout, executive assistant.

Okay.

Great.

Thank you very much.

Um, I'll issue a ruling within sometime next week.

Okay, thank you.