Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the December 15th Rules Committee meeting.

I'm your chair, Supervisor Shimon Walton, joined by Vice Chair, Supervisor Stephen Sherrill,

and soon to be joined by Supervisor Mandelman.

Today's clerk is Victor Young, and we have Jamie Escheverry with SFGovTV

that will make sure our meeting is publicized and made public to the community.

Mr. Clerk, do we have any announcements this morning?

Yes. Public comment will be taken on each item on this agenda.

Where an item of interest comes up and public comment is called,

please line up to speak on your right.

Alternatively, you may submit public comment in writing in either of the following ways.

Email them to myself, the Rules Committee Clerk, at victor.youg at sfgov.org.

If you submit public comment via email, it will be included as part of the file.

You may also send your written comments via U.S. mail to our office in City Hall, 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett-Plays, room 244, San Francisco, California, 94102.

Please make sure to silence all cell phones and electronic devices.

Documents to be included as part of the file should be submitted to the clerk.

Items acted upon today are expected to appear on the Board of Supervisors' agenda of January 6,

2026, unless otherwise stated. That completes my initial announcements.

Thank you. Would you please call item number one?

Item number one is a hearing to consider appointing three members to the Housing Authority of the City and County of San Francisco

Board of Commissioners. Terms to be determined.

Thank you so much, Mr. Clerk, and I believe that our candidates are here.

I will call them up in order that they appear on the agenda and you just have a couple minutes to tell us about

Why you want to serve and be a part of this body? And so first we have Sharon Lai

Good morning chair Walton supervisor Cheryl. I'm Sharon Lai

It is an honor to be before you today to be considered for the housing authority appointment

especially during these uncertain budgetary times.

I actually grew up in public housing myself

and having gone through housing instability up until my teens,

so serving within the housing space has always been a motivator for me.

I have had the privilege of living and serving the city for close to two decades now

from working as a city planner for the San Francisco Planning Department,

working on approving housing, zoning plans,

to delivering and building housing across all types within the nonprofit and private markets.

I have also worked on economic recovery efforts for San Francisco post-pandemic

and currently work for a local community development corporation in the Bay Area

where we primarily serve low-income families working to deliver and operate housing,

providing services and community building efforts for three Bay Area counties.

I'm currently the chief strategy officer there, which means that I work on resourcing alignment

as well as ensuring that we are making the right decisions around where and how we do work.

I happen to also have the privilege of overseeing two important departments there,

including the community and resident services department,

which is part of the work that the Housing Authority does, as well as community planning and placemaking.

Is that my time?

Well, I am very pleased to be able to continue to serve the city

and look forward to contributing to the important work of the Housing Authority.

Thank you.

Thank you so much.

And next we have Cynthia Alvarez.

Hi, good morning.

My name is Cynthia Alvarez, and sorry, I'm holding this down because it's kind of leaning a little.

My apologies.

There. I feel like I should start singing.

So my name is Cynthia Alvarez, and I am very grateful for the opportunity to be considered for an appointment to the San Francisco Housing Authority's Board of Commissioners.

I currently serve as president and CEO of Christian Church Homes, a nonprofit affordable housing developer and operator.

We have homes and are responsible for the well-being of residents and the quality of those homes in six different states.

I have lived in San Francisco for a little bit more than 20 years now.

I have three kids.

I am an immigrant, came to the U.S., crossed the border at night, was undocumented, and received documentation through an amnesty.

I have worked in a number of affordable housing nonprofit organizations here in San Francisco,

so I am keenly aware of the opportunities as well as the challenges that come with a public housing organization,

and these times are especially challenging.

I have experience in compliance, regulatory affairs, governance, finance, housing development.

I am extremely committed to ensuring that we center residents in the work that we do.

It's what I've been doing in the time that I've been in affordable housing.

I appreciate the time to be here and, again, hope to be able to contribute to the commission.

Thank you.

Thank you.

and I just want to state I appreciate both candidates for wanting to step up

and serve this is a crucial time for this particular Commission and with the

cuts that we have at the federal government and all the work that we need

to do to stabilize our communities it's you got a lot of important work that

will be in front of us so I want to thank you both for being willing to

serve President Meadowman thank you Chair Walton I want to echo those

comments. I've been a fan of Sharon Lies for some time. She has served the city

on on boards and commissions and has demonstrated I think tremendous capacity

to serve as well as substantive knowledge around housing that I think

will be useful on this body and I've gotten to know Cynthia Alvarez through

her interest in this position and I have become a big fan of hers as well and

And I think these are just two great folks who will serve us well.

Thank you.

Seeing no other comments, we will go to public comment on this item.

Yes.

Members of the public who should speak on this item should line up to speak at this time.

Each speaker will be allowed two minutes.

Are there any members of the public who would like to speak on this matter?

There are no speakers on this matter.

Thank you.

Seeing no public comment.

Seeing no speakers, public comment is now closed.

And Mr. Clerk, I'd like to make a motion to move forward with the positive recommendation.

Sharon Lai to the full board for seat six and Cynthia Alvarez to the full board for seat seven.

As a committee report.

Yes, I motion to recommend as a committee report.

Vice Chair Sherrill.

Sherrill, aye.

Member Mandelman.

Aye.

Mandelman, aye.

Chair Walton.

Aye.

Walton, aye.

that motion passes without objection. Thank you. Motion carries. Congratulations. Mr. Clerk,

please go to item number two. Item number two is to consider appointing one member term ending

September 6, 2027 to the Assessment Appeals Board number two. Thank you so much. And I believe we

have Jose Edmilson here with us this morning. Please take a couple of minutes to tell us about

your experience and why you want to serve.

Yes.

Good morning, supervisors, members of the rules committee.

I'm very excited to be here in front of you to present my credentials

and why I think my experience will serve well for the requirements of the seat.

I have been in finance since 1999.

I started at Bank of American Investment Services.

and while working full-time at Bank of America and raising a family in San Francisco,

I got my MBA at Golden Gate University in personal finance

and also got my CFP designation, Certified Financial Planning.

And while I loved a lot the investment side,

Once I got involved or exposed to the real estate side of the business, I got hooked.

So I decided to get my license in 2004 and leave the investments and move to the real estate side as a broker,

which I have been doing since then.

As part of what I do on a daily basis, I meet with both individuals and business owners

and go through initial interviewing process to understand their goals

and then fully assess their finances,

which includes their income, employment assets, and credit report

so I can structure the loan to submit for underwriting review.

And once the clients get in contract, we go through the appraisal process,

which is probably the most part at this point.

And while today the environment, it's not, we don't have a lot of appraisals that come under value.

In this so-called mortgage meltdown, in between the years 2006, 2011,

we had a lot of those cases where part of my job was fully understand, analyze the appraisal reports,

and go out in the community and find comparable sales reports

to try to make a point in reintroducing a new property that the appraiser had missed.

So I think that based on my analytical skills, the real estate experience, finance,

and I would say mostly working on a daily basis with clients,

my experience will serve to meet the requirements of the board.

And I'm excited about the opportunity, truly am.

Thank you.

Thank you so much.

I don't see any comments or questions from colleagues.

Mr. Clerk, let's go to public comment.

Yes, members of the public who wish to speak on this item should line up to speak at this time.

Each speaker will be allowed two minutes.

Are there any members of the public who would like to speak on this matter?

There are no additional speakers on this matter.

Thank you. Seeing no speakers, public comment is now closed.

I'd like to make a motion to refer this item to the full board with recommendation as a committee report.

Yes, on the motion to recommend the appointment of Mr. Sobral to seat 5 as a committee report.

Vice Chair Sherrill.

Aye.

Sherrill, aye.

Member Mandelman.

Mandelman absent.

Chair Walton.

Aye.

The motion passes with Member Mandelman being absent.

Thank you so much, Mr. Clerk.

Motion carries.

Congratulations.

Please call item number three.

Item number three is a resolution accepting the biannual surveillance report under Administrative

Code Section 19B.6 for the Juvenile Probation Department.

Thank you so much.

I know we have representatives from the department.

Good morning, committee members.

My name is Elisa Baeza from the juvenile probation department and my colleague.

My name is Cindy Aguilar.

I am the juvenile justice center initiative coordinator and I do the implementation and

management of the web filtering tool.

Thanks, Cindy.

We're here to just present a few highlights of the already submitted biannual surveillance

report for the web filtering software.

All of you should have a short printout.

and we wanted to share a few highlights on how the year has been going this far.

And just as a refresher, the software is a tool that is used to support youth safety and programming.

It filters out distracting harmful content such as social media, games, explicit material,

preventing firewall bypassing.

It's meant to support programming overall.

to ensure a safe online learning environment.

As far as how it's been used,

key staff, Cindy Aguilar,

is able to monitor websites visited in real time

through automated summary reports,

but also rapidly respond to access requests by the youth.

So it's been pretty effective in that sense.

the 12 blocks restricted content instantly staff review time has dropped by 75 percent

you'd consistently use approved websites and there are no incidents of prohibited

communication such as contacting victims online while in use trends between April and May 11,700

sites were visited and 466 sites were blocked, such as movie streaming or cash apps. Between

September and October, 23,800 sites were visited and 334 sites were blocked. The web usage

blockage was doubled, or sorry, web usage doubled and the blockage content decreased by 28%.

So this shows us that it's a responsible web use and effective filtering without overblocking.

Youth stay focused, and staff no longer need to manually check each device to review websites.

The main challenge now is occasional delays of approving sites, but we're working on that to reduce.

So in closing, we just wanted to wrap up by saying that the web filtering tool this past year has proved effective.

It works in the way that it's intended, always with the goal of safe access and learning for the youth.

And we welcome any questions as you consider our report.

Thank you.

Thank you so much.

I do just have a couple of questions.

When we look at key data trends in the state's blocked content decreased by 28%,

what's the percentage goal, or is that the mark?

Since this is like our first year, we're building a baseline.

It's been about a year-ish implementation, and so what you're looking at is the baseline.

So we're building it, and from there on, it's only going to be analyzed going further.

So what you're seeing now in the trend, there were fewer sites blocked, the 20%,

which means that the youth understand that, you know,

they shouldn't be watching music videos during learning time or what have you.

Like they know that they're supposed to be researching for their paper.

So it almost redirects the user and they know the expectations now.

So that's kind of what it's showing.

But it's our baseline.

But that's a good question.

We'll be able to analyze it from there on out.

Got it.

And then when you talk about youth and staff experience, it says youth stay focused.

How do we gauge that?

How do we know the youth are staying focused?

We have real-time monitoring.

so during real time say there's a classroom for computer usage there is a staff monitoring real

time so and you can literally chat with them like oh where you know if there needs to be redirected

to or asked of what site they're on got it i don't have any more questions i don't see any

from colleagues thank you mr clerk let's go to public comment yes members the public wish to

speak on this item should line up to speak at this time. Each speaker will be allowed two minutes.

Are there any members of the public who wish to speak on this matter? There are no additional

speakers on this matter. Thank you. Seeing no public comment, seeing no speakers, public comment

is now closed. Mr. Clerk, I would like to make a motion to move this forward to the full board

with recommendation. Yes, on that motion, Vice Chair Sherrill. Sherrill, aye. Member Mandelman.

Aye. Madam and I. Chair Walton. Aye. Walton, aye. That motion passes without objection.

Thank you so much. Motion carries. Mr. Clerk, please call item number four.

Item number four is a hearing to discuss the United States Navy failures to promptly disclose the detection of airborne plutonium at the Hunter's Point shipyard to obtain full disclosure,

ensure accountability and protect the Bayview Hunters Point community as well as provide every

document every test result and every explanation for the failure and to outline what protections

if any were in place during the 11 months the public was kept in the dark the navies identified

contamination in November 2024 but did not report it to the city and county of San Francisco until

October 2025, raising serious concerns about transparency, public health, and trust in

federal oversight, and requesting the U.S. Navy Environmental Protection Agency, California

Department of Public Health, and the San Francisco Department of Public Health to report.

Thank you so much, Mr. Clerk.

Colleagues, as you may know, in October of this year, the Navy informed the San Francisco

Department of Public Health that an air sample collected in November of 2024 at parcel C of the

shipyard detected airborne plutonium at a level above the established action level. This was

almost a year after discovery. This is unacceptable and this has unfortunately been par for the course

for the Navy to lack transparency and decide what is appropriate for the public to know

concerning its own health. We want to ensure safety of all residents on and around the shipyard.

For too many years, the community has had to endure the environmental hazards around cleanup,

and the number one goal is to achieve complete cleanup of the shipyard so that families and

community can be safe. When samples detect anything that could harm the community, we have a right to

know immediately. The San Francisco Department of Public Health and the San Francisco Office of

Community Investment and Infrastructure informed our office and community about the plutonium

detection. We have met with the Navy, the San Francisco Department of Public Health, the Office

of Community and Investment in Infrastructure, Speaker Pelosi's office, the Environmental

Protection Agency, and attended the Citizens Advisory Committee meeting for the shipyard

to hear from the Navy as to why they took so long to inform the community of the discovered

plutonium.

We also have called today's hearing so that we can hear from the Navy about why it took

so long to disclose this information?

What are the dangers to community after this discovery?

How do we make sure that this never happens again?

And what are you doing to allow for better collaboration

with community?

In addition, we're going to hear from the San Francisco

Department of Public Health and the Environmental Protection

Agency on their oversight roles.

We want to make sure that this lack of transparency does not continue.

So first, we are going to hear from the San Francisco Department of Public Health.

Then we'll hear from the Navy.

Then we'll hear from the Environmental Protection Agency.

And we will start with the San Francisco Department of Public Health.

And I believe we have Dr. Susan Phillips present this morning.

Thank you, Dr. Phillips.

Good morning, and thank you, Chair Walton,

for the invitation to speak with you, and good morning,

Vice Chair Sherrill and President Mandelman.

My name is Dr. Susan Phillip.

I am the Health Officer for San Francisco and the Director

of the Population Health Division

at the San Francisco Department of Public Health.

Joining me is Asa King, Deputy Director of Community Health

in our division.

Next slide, please.

Our commitment is to advocate for the highest standards

of public health protection, transparency,

and accountability during cleanup of the shipyard.

The way in which we do this is through engagement

and communication with community, resourcing community

with supports to improve health outcomes,

and collaboration with the Navy and regulatory agencies.

The cleanup processes at the shipyard are strictly governed

under federal law.

The comprehensive environmental response, compensation,

and Liability Act of 1980, or CERCLA,

which is sometimes commonly referred to as Superfund.

Note that we at SFDPH do not have a regulatory role

in the restoration activities performed by the Navy.

Our multidisciplinary team of DPH environmental,

medical, and public health experts monitors the process

and ensures the health and well-being

of all San Francisco's is protected throughout.

Next slide, please.

The Federal Facilities Agreement under CERCLA requires

that the Navy notify state and local agencies

and affected members of the public when the situation may present

an endangerment to public health.

It is a responsibility of federal regulators, which is EPA,

and the state regulatory agencies to make determinations

about safety based on that information.

The Navy has also stated that its information sharing

with the community includes posting air monitoring reports

on its website on a quarterly basis.

Collaborative and transparent information sharing

with SFDPH and regulatory agencies is essential

for comprehensive public health protection

and for fostering public trust.

Next slide, please.

For a timeline of events related to our SF-DPH involvement

in this issue of the plutonium exceedance,

in early October of this year, DPH learned from the Navy

that air monitoring results from November of 2024

showed a plutonium reading above the action level.

DPH conducted eternal review and coordinated with regulators

at that time.

On October 30th, DPH sent the Navy a letter requesting more information,

and community stakeholders were also sent this letter to notify them of the exceedance.

On October 31, DPH convened a meeting with Navy senior leadership and with EPA

to understand the risk to the public.

And that same day, DPH emailed a statement to the community

stating that there was no immediate public health risk based on the information shared in that meeting.

On November 7th, the Navy sent a letter to DPH saying that information would be sent soon.

DPH then sent a second letter reiterating its request for information and copied community stakeholders.

On November 12th, the Navy sent DPH laboratory reports and calculations for air monitoring samples.

DPH reviewed the data and conferred with regulatory agencies.

On December 10th, DPH sent a letter

to the community stakeholders stating

that we had reviewed the information, discussed with regulators,

and reestablished the original conclusion

that no additional action was needed at that time based

on that exceedance.

Next slide, please.

As for next steps, the California Department of Toxic Substances Control,

one of the regulators of this process,

has requested additional information from the Navy.

We will confer with them and with other regulators

on their review of the Navy's incident report,

which was expected early next year.

Sustained community partnership is also really important.

We will continue to attend the community advisory committee meetings

and other community meetings to hear community concerns

and present on the DPH services and activities.

And we continue to take measures to protect and enhance health

of communities surrounding the shipyard.

In partnership with UCSF, DPH has established a new resource

in environmental health clinical practice for patients

of the Southeast Family Health Center,

and our department will also continue to monitor cleanup processes

at the shipyard and take necessary action to protect public health.

Thank you.

Thank you so much, Dr. Phillips.

I do have a few questions.

So my first question is, I guess, for the public and just in real simple terms,

what is the Department of Public Health's role when it comes to the shipyard project?

The San Francisco Department of Public Health's role is the local public health agency.

Our role is to follow along very closely with the process of the cleanup,

including having an environmental engineer with specialty in this area,

review data, review new information as it comes up,

work with the Navy and regulatory agencies in order that we as a department

can understand what is being done at the cleanup.

but we do not have a regulatory role at this point.

The regulatory role of the Department of Public Health occurs

after land has been transferred to the city and county of San Francisco.

If it gets transferred.

Sorry?

If it gets transferred.

Yes.

And what excuse did the Navy give the Department of Public Health

for waiting almost a year to disclose its finding?

What we understood from the letters that were sent by the Navy and by its presentation at the advisory committee meeting was that they were looking at the data.

They had one exceedance, and they were reviewing that data as well and doing further information, gathering,

and that they did not conclude that that one exceedance posed a risk to public health.

And from the Department of Public Health, San Francisco Department of Public Health's assessment,

how much danger does the plutonium detection cause the community?

The particular exceedance that was above the action level still falls below,

well below the immediate danger level to public health.

So in some sense, that was correct, that this immediate reading was not

at a level that would cause immediate public health action that was necessary

on the part of the communities or on the part of the department.

However, that determination is to be made by the regulatory agency.

So my greater concern, of course, is the delay in notifying the regulators

who are the ones who are to make that determination about safety.

I think on slide three, you talked about an agreement that the Navy has with the department

and local organizations to notify when detection of something harmful to the public is discovered.

Does it provide a timeline for when the Navy is supposed to inform those local and state agencies?

That Federal Facilities Agreement, or FFA, is between the Navy, the EPA as the federal regulators,

and some state regulatory bodies.

It is not directly with the San Francisco Department of Public Health.

However, the practice has been to also inform us as local public health of any issues.

I believe the EPA will speak directly to this,

but my understanding is that the timeline is within two weeks around that time frame.

So not almost a year?

Correct.

That is my understanding, and I would want EPA to speak to that as well.

Thank you.

And just from the Department of Public Health process,

what actions or steps has the department taken to ensure that this doesn't happen again?

What we have done is review the processes that we take internally

to make sure that we are both timely and looking at the data that we have.

The primary determination for safety is with the regulators.

So I do see my role as health officer and our role as the department to ensure that there's timely communication of any exceedances

so that those regulatory agencies can do their work, make a determination, we confer with them,

and then we help communicate to the public of those answers and results.

So I do see that as our role, and we will continue to work on processes to improve our ability to carry out that important function.

Thank you, Dr. Phillips.

I don't have any more questions for the department.

I'm seeing none from colleagues.

Thank you.

Thank you.

You may have further questions later on.

Now we will hear from the Navy.

Good morning, President Mandelman.

Supervisor Walton, Supervisor Cheryl, and community members.

My name's Anthony Megliola, and I'm the director of the Base Ray Lime Enclosure Program Management Office West.

I'm here today with Danielle Janda from my team,

and also joining us is Dr. Catherine Higley from Oregon State University.

She's a distinguished professor of nuclear science and engineering.

The Navy takes a comprehensive approach to clean up at the former Hunters Point Naval

Shipyard to ensure the safety and health of the community.

I want to begin by acknowledging the delay in sharing the information regarding the detection

of plutonium 239 created concern and frustration in the community and amongst our regulatory

agency partners.

We take this very seriously and understand the importance of expeditious flow of information

to ensure transparency and confidence in the cleanup process.

I speak to you today both as a Navy representative and as someone who has dedicated the last

two decades responsibly cleaning up former military installations and converting those

properties to successful civilian reuse.

of these transformations can be seen around the state.

I understand confidence in the work and transparency

of the process are paramount, especially when it comes

to work being performed at the former shipyard.

The Navy's number one priority is protection of human health.

The concentration of plutonium detected was extremely low

and did not represent a potential health risk to workers

on site or the surrounding community.

Our presentation in a moment will go into those details

that Ms. Janda will give.

Our second priority is technical accuracy, confirming data,

retesting, and validating results

under strict laboratory protocols.

While that focus is important in this situation,

it came at the cost of timely communication and consideration

of how the delay would be felt by the community

and our regulatory agency partners.

I take responsibility for this.

My team has had several meetings with federal, state, and local agencies, shared all information,

and is working collaboratively with our regulatory agency partners to further define lines of

communication and associated notifications to ensure the situation is not repeated.

I will briefly touch on four important areas.

The facts about the detection, what the science confirms, reasons behind the communication

lag, and steps we are taking to improve notification procedures and transparency.

Starting with what happened in March of 2025, we were made aware that one air filter sample

collected in November of 2024 showed plutonium-239 above our action level.

The action level is a screening threshold used to check how well dust control measures

are working, it is not a health risk limit.

It is a trigger to review on-site dust control procedures,

and the action level is set extremely low to allow time

for data collection and laboratory analysis.

That one action level exceedance was the only plutonium exceedance

among more than 200 samples collected since July of 2023.

On-site activities during the sampling period that week were limited

to asphalt removal and grinding.

During that week, real-time particulate matter,

dust monitoring showed no exceedances.

This outlier detection of plutonium-239 did not pose any risk.

For context, the highest potential dose the detection could represent

is one-tenth of what one would receive on a flight from San Francisco to New York,

or one hundredth the amount of radiation one would receive from a medical X-ray.

The detection was confirmed to be an isolated anomaly,

and additional laboratory testing of the sample did not reproduce the detection.

When the detection data from November was reported by the laboratory in March,

understanding it posed no risk, we focused on retesting the sample

and evaluating the on-site activities to ensure accuracy

and having a more complete picture before making public statements about the data.

We recognize this approach did not meet the community's expectations for timely communication

and the long gap undermined trust.

We also recognize that while we set and follow strict protocols to protect the health and safety

of everyone who works and lives near the former shipyard,

we have not communicated enough about what those safety protocols are.

Doing so could have provided the public an understanding and assurance of just how seriously we take this responsibility.

We are committed to improving.

This means timely update on any future findings with clear context for what the results mean,

enhanced coordination with the regulatory agencies to ensure alignment and transparency,

expanded community engagement and communication about what is involved in the air monitoring and cleanup process,

and better collaboration with independent experts hired by the city of san francisco and community

groups we can and will do better going forward while the detection was an extremely small

measuring measurement which posed no risk we fully recognize and appreciate how concerning

news of a plutonium detection is our goal is to rebuild confidence through transparency

accountability and partnership miss janda will now provide a more detailed information briefing

about the action level the exceedance the data evaluation and how we will improve the process

going forward thank you for your time this morning hey good morning i'm pulling up a presentation

okay hi I'm Danielle Janda I'm going to talk a little bit more about what what happened what

we know about the plutonium detection but just before I started I do want to reiterate what

Tony said about the measurement of plutonium it was very low which I'll talk about more and put

the action level into context and what the action level meant it's very important that we provide

accurate and timely information. And in this instance, we valued the accuracy over the timeliness.

And it's very obvious that lost us trust in the community. And so we're going to continue to

present at the Citizens Advisory Committee, continue to build relationships with the community

to try to work to get that trust back.

So just before I get into this,

this is kind of an overview of the situation.

We have a multi-layered approach

to protecting safety and health

of both our workers on site

and also the surrounding community.

We have really robust dust control measures

that are in place.

We have several different types of data that we collect in the field.

We have people watching the desk control measures,

but we also have the data that shows if they're working effectively

and notifying workers if they need to stop work,

if they need to reevaluate their desk control measures.

We did bring a couple of fact sheets.

One of them describes these desk control measures.

You can find them over at the kiosk over there.

They're also available on our website.

Part of the sampling, part of the thorough sampling that we do to make sure our dust control is working, we collect real-time dust monitoring.

So that's particulate matter that's measured constantly throughout the day, every day, that contractors can check frequently.

And we also collect what's called ambient air samples.

So those are sample collection points that are put both upwind and downwind of work being performed.

It collects air throughout the week, anytime there's any dust-generating activity.

And those samples are collected and taken off to a laboratory for analysis.

The levels we're trying to read are very, very low, so that's the technology that we can use as a laboratory analysis.

And so that does take several months to get those results back.

So our primary tool for checking our dust control measures is the real-time data on-site.

We have these action levels that we set, as Tony said, are set low.

In this case, the plutonium, it was set at 20% of the health limits.

and that's to allow time for anybody to,

for the contractors to stop, reassess their work as needed.

So before it gets to any kind of health concern,

there's controls in place for them to respond.

As Tony said, this is a very, very low concentration.

The maximum dose it represents is 0.4 millirem per year.

that's well below what we are exposed to on a day-to-day basis,

and it never presented a health risk at any time.

But it was unusual, right?

The result we got was unusual.

At that time, we had collected over 160 samples at this project site.

We never had a plutonium result like that.

There was no...

We were not working with any native soil.

We were just working with asphalt that was installed in 2018.

There's no reason to think that there was plutonium in the material we were working with.

Also, there was no elevated dust measurements that week.

So it was just an unusual result.

And for that reason, we resampled the same sample, and that came back as non-detect.

So we had this one sample, and we had two analyses, and we wanted to know what that meant.

Did that mean that, was that just part of the nature of these low-level analyses,

that it's intricate laboratory procedures?

Or is it an indication that the laboratory was not working the way that they were supposed to work,

follow their SOPs?

And for that reason, we did an independent verification of the laboratory.

We reached out to a third-party auditor, and that process took some time,

which is the reason for the delay in reporting the results.

So I'm going to go through these five topics, again explain the action level, share some

considerations for why we thought that was an outlier, explain our evaluation and reporting

process, summarize the information, and also discuss how we're going to do better moving

forward.

So the action level.

First, before I get into the action level, just a summary of what plutonium is and why we're sampling for it in the first place.

Plutonium is found in the environment all around us.

It was part of nuclear fallout from nuclear testing.

So there are trace levels of plutonium all just throughout the world.

but we're looking at it specifically at Hunter's Point because the ships that were involved in this testing process,

they were taken back to Hunter's Point for decontamination.

So that's one of the reasons why we look for plutonium.

Again, the action level, it's a threshold for evaluating our dust control measures.

It's not a public health limit.

We set it at 12 millirem per year.

So that's 20% below the regulatory health-based limit, and that's also representative of an exposure if you were to be exposed to that over the course of the year.

In this case, it was one sample, so it represented a week.

we also as I said because the action levels are very very low

10 to the negative 15 microcuries per gram

we have to the only way to measure that level is through a laboratory

with really intricate laboratory procedures so it does take some time to get the analysis back

so as a check before that filter leaves the site

we do a rad scan a radiological scan of that filter

So that's just another piece of qualitative information to tell us that there is no elevated radiation coming into that sample.

The action level, it means contractor needs to evaluate what they're doing, and that's what they did in this case.

They got the sample back in the result back in March.

They retrained their employees.

In this case, they decided to increase the amount of wetting of water that was placed at the site to reduce any kind of dust.

And that's what the action level was meant to do.

So, again, we consider this an outlier.

We've never received a result like this before.

We were not working with anything that should have had a potential of plutonium.

We were working with modern asphalt.

The air filter that was pre-screened didn't show any elevated radiation.

We also had no dust elevation measurements during that week.

And so for that reason, that's why we felt like it was really unusual,

and we wanted to understand the accuracy.

The sample was reanalyzed, and the reanalysis came back as non-detect.

So again, we had two samples.

One was detected plutonium.

One had non-detect from the same exact sample collection.

The amount of plutonium that the sample represents is about the size of a red blood cell.

These are very, very low concentrations, again, which is why we have the laboratory.

which is quite complex process to measure.

So what we are evaluating when we look at these is,

are our dust control measures working?

So we follow dust control measures through our approved work plans.

They include a variety of methods, including tactifiers that we put on soil.

It includes any time there's dust movement, we have water out there to reduce the ability for it to become airborne.

Again, we collect both upwind and downwind air sampling.

We collect dust, real-time dust monitoring.

And again, during this week, there was nothing that indicated there should be a source of plutonium.

So this slide kind of helps.

For me, it helps visualize what we were doing.

So the asphalt that we were working with, that's in the green area in Parcel C.

We have two locations where we collect these ambient air sampling.

We have one upwind and downwind.

The detection that we're talking about today, that was in the downwind location, so it's MSCO2.

We also collected a simultaneous sample at the upwind location, MSCO1, and that was non-detect.

The sample was collected in November.

we got the results in March

and that's when

we knew it was not a

potential health risk but it was

unusual and that's when we started

looking at

is this sample

is it really representative

of a real measurement

reanalyzed it that didn't tell us much

because we had two different results

and then just to make sure that the

laboratory was working effectively we

conducted a laboratory audit

Yeah, talk about the real-time dust monitoring.

This is an example of what data we collect and what we share.

We share this weekly with our regulatory agencies.

We put it on our website biweekly, but it just shows this is real-time measurements

that we take.

And as you can see, the measurements of this week were below the action limit.

This figure is just to put into perspective,

we use a lot of numbers, 10 millirem, all that,

health risks.

So this just puts into perspective on the left

some of the regulatory limits.

The NRC standard for radionuclides in air is 50 millirem.

Our action level is 20% of that.

And the potential resulting dose, maximum dose,

that could have occurred if someone was standing

that air sampling location for a full week was 0.4 millirems. So that just this

just shows you how it works compared to the other the action limits. It also on

the right those are typical sources of radiation that we face on a day-to-day

basis.

Okay so again after receiving the outlier we wanted to know if our laboratory was

working effectively. They have specific standard operating procedures that they

have to follow. It's very low levels so this is a complicated type of data

analysis and not every laboratory can do it so we wanted to make sure that they

were following the procedures. We reached out to all our laboratories need to be

accredited by a DOD eLAP program so we reached out to them and they reached out

to an accrediting agency to do a third-party audit.

They visited the laboratory.

They did a detailed analysis of how they do their work.

And ultimately, in September, they determined that the lab was, in fact, working to their requirements.

So at the end of the day, we have these two results, and both of them we have to consider as accurate.

I'm going to talk a little bit about our normal reporting process.

We do provide quarterly monitoring reports for all our projects.

Those are on our website.

They do take some time.

We have to get the data back.

It goes through a review process, so it takes about six months to get those on our website.

In this case, we did not get it up in six months because of that laboratory audit that we wanted to get done

to make sure that the data that we're showing in the reports is accurate.

So just summarizing everything I talked about, we take health and safety of the workers and

people living around the shipyard very seriously.

We have a wide range of tools, of methods that we use to make sure that there is no

potential exposure, especially to people that are close to the work.

There's a health and safety plan.

There's a dust monitoring plan that we follow very closely.

At the end of the day, we wanted to make sure that the data was valid before bringing it

to the public.

And there were a lot of reasons why we weren't sure about that.

But looking forward, I think it's very clear that we need to bring information sooner rather

than later, even when we're uncertain about what the results mean.

We're working with our regulatory partners to create a very clear timeline of notification

process and what type of information we would people want to know about and we would notify

sooner rather than later.

We're also working on sharing as much information as we can via our website.

We have the error monitoring report is available.

We have some fact sheets.

We have a couple of fact sheets here today if you'd like some more information.

And all of this information is on our website.

So for any other, these are our resources we have.

Any community members want to know about what's going on at the site?

Michael Pound is the BRAC environmental coordinator.

He will be going to the citizens' advisory committee meetings every other month.

For anybody interested in the shipyard, not just at the plutonium but everything else,

I strongly encourage people to attend.

We try to listen to what people are interested in and explain what's going on at the shipyard.

The next one is going to be in January.

We also have Dr. Higley, who's here today, if you have any detailed questions about radiation science or radiation health.

But she's also available on a monthly basis for office hours, or you could call her if anybody has a question they want to hear from an expert.

You can contact us via our info email or phone call.

And, of course, we have regulatory agencies that you can reach out to.

So that's it for my presentation.

Thank you very much for listening, and I'm here to answer any questions.

Thank you.

I think the first thing I want to say is while we appreciate apologies,

this is absolutely not the first time that the Navy has lost the public's trust in the Hunters Point community.

So it's very disheartening that we would have a situation where

non-disclosure of something that could be dangerous to the public would happen.

Because, again, we've had a rocky relationship for a long time.

Before I, because I do have several questions,

but I do want to just ask Dr. Higley to state on record what the danger

of the detection of this level of plutonium is for a community.

So your question was what is the risk posed

by the plutonium that was detected?

Correct.

So the amount of plutonium that was detected

in this particular sample is so low that advisory bodies,

such as the one that I'm a president of,

the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements,

would consider it a negligible dose.

So it's very, very, very small.

Thank you.

And to the Navy, when you say that this was,

this detection was not health risk level.

What happens when we do detect something

that is the level of health risk?

We would notify our regulatory partners

and the San Francisco Department of Public Health

immediately if there was a health risk.

We have a lot of, again, we have a lot of controls in place

so that we don't get to that point,

but if there was something that represented a health risk

to the local community would absolutely notify people immediately.

And how do we know that that's true when I believe it was stated the community was supposed to be notified

within a certain time period when you detected even this small level of plutonium?

So because this was not a health risk, the action level didn't represent any kind of health risk,

there was never any indication that the community would have been at risk.

Is there an agreement in place that says the Navy needs to inform regulatory agencies and community within two weeks?

We have a federal facilities agreement that, yes, if there is a health concern, we are supposed to notify our regulators within two weeks.

Only for health concern, not for?

Yes, for health concern.

Not for detection of plutonium?

It's not that specific, no.

So let me ask you this, because I know you stated that, or I believe you stated plutonium is everywhere.

Yes.

But yet you stated that you didn't think you were working with material that would detect plutonium.

Can you explain that?

Ask Dr. Higley to explain that.

If plutonium is everywhere, how can we never assume that something is not going to have material that could contain plutonium?

So we know that plutonium is very, very broadly distributed because of the atmospheric weapons tests that took place decades ago.

And so it has moved all around the Earth.

The issue is it's there, but it's at really very, very, very low concentrations.

So if you want to detect it, you have to work really hard to see it.

and some geologists actually use it for soil erosion cases.

But it's quite an effort to actually detect it, but it is there.

So I know that we've had several meetings since this detection.

I know that the Navy, the EPA, the Department of Public Health,

and others have gone out to community.

But I really want to hear from the Navy how we know that this will never happen again.

We're working with our regulatory partners to get written agreements

to be very clear about when and how we're going to notify the public

and about what rises to that level,

which is not just going to be a health concern,

something that people are just concerned about so they know the information.

Like I said, we're going to continue to go to the Citizens Advisory Committee meetings, hear from the community, hear about their concerns, and improve our communication that way.

When you talk about you went through the additional validation process, I'm just curious as to why, even prior to March, you didn't disclose the possibility,

and when you found out in March you didn't disclose what was detected?

And why would it take from March all the way to October

to provide the information that plutonium was detected,

especially after you went through the validation process?

That's how long the validation process took.

That's how long the audit of the laboratory took

in order to determine whether or not the laboratory was in fact working

and according to the way they were supposed to be working.

So up until that audit was complete, we did not know if that was an accurate result.

And you didn't think to say, community, something may be dangerous,

there may be a possibility that we need to make sure you understand

that there could be a health risk,

and we want you to know we're looking into it to make sure that that's not the case?

I think, sir, is that when we got that data,

we knew immediately what that number was

and knew that there was no health risk.

And so that's why, like looking back on it now,

I wish we had made those phone calls,

and it seems like it makes perfect sense.

Plutonium, no matter what the level,

it just has a scary sound to it.

But I think with the scientists and engineers looking

at this data and it was communicated,

hey, we got this outlier, it's very strange, we're going to look at it further,

but there is no public risk or risk to workers whatsoever.

And so that's why it didn't, at the time, trigger us to start that notification process.

And as Danielle said, if it was at a different level that was even a potential risk,

then very definitely we would have embarked on those notifications immediately.

and also as Danielle said but going forward we're working to identify these

types of scenarios that even if we have something that we look at and we know

there's no risk what makes good sense for communication and transparency

purposes and so that's what we're committed to and now that a lot of folks

are informed of what was detected. How have you been continuing to get information out

to shipyard community, the broader community? What tools are you using to make sure the public

is aware? The tools we use, of course, the Citizens Advisory Committee has been a great place for us

to share information, but we also put information on our website. When we put it on, we try to do

email blasts so that if anybody's on our

email point of contact list, we have about

1,500 people. Anybody's welcome to get on that.

That's our primary source of getting information out as quickly as possible.

We also do several community engagement activities such as

periodic bus tours of the installation,

events in conjunction with the shipyard artist and

things of that nature. But those are part of what you communicated that the plutonium was detected

or that's just something you do in general? We do that on a regular basis. So we present at the CAC

six times a year. We do two, at least two times a year, we do bus tours so people can come to

Hunter's Point and see what we're doing. We meet with the HOA board of the people that live closest

to Hunter's Point. We meet with the artists, Shipyard Trust

for the Arts. So pretty much if anybody wants us to

go speak at their meeting, we go and speak.

I don't have any more questions right now for the Navy. I don't see anything.

Thank you. And we will now hear from

Michael Montgomery from the Environmental Protection Agency.

I see everybody's been trying to get this thing to.

There we go.

Good morning, Supervisors Walton, Mandelman, and Cheryl,

and community members.

My name is Mike Montgomery.

I am the director for US EPA Region 9 Superfund

and Emergency Management Division.

I'm here with Eurisa Martinez, Leon, Maeve Clancy, and Mike

Collins all involved with working on this project.

Thank you for the opportunity to address the plutonium data

at the Hunter's Point shipyard and the Navy's failure

to report results in a timely manner to EPA, the state,

the city, and the community.

Similar to what was already stated by the city and the Navy today,

and as EPA has stated previously, I want to reassure everyone

that the plutonium exceedance of the monitoring action levels

does not pose a health risk to those living

or working in Hunter's Point.

The level detected was well below the risk range

that we use for Superfund.

The potential increase in risk from the exceedance is extremely

small and not measurable by epidemiological studies.

Six excess cancer risks per 100 million people.

Our team of EPA risk assessors who specialize

in evaluating such risks have thoroughly reviewed the

available data to ensure that the community health was not

compromised by this exceedance.

Through our oversight role for the Hunters Point Project,

EPA is dedicated to ensuring that cleanup actions are

protective now and into perpetuity.

With our state partners, we closely monitor cleanup

activities and the data they generate,

evaluate compliance with environmental standards,

and ensure that all actions meet rigorous safety criteria.

We have a team of project managers, technical experts,

and contract staff performing oversight activities daily.

Our contractor staff are on site daily,

and our EPA project managers frequently visit the site.

As part of our oversight, we're taking confirmation soil samples

during the radiological rework and analyzing them

at our National Radiation Laboratory.

This represents a commitment of our staff and resources far greater

than any other Department of Defense Superfund site within EPA Region 9.

However, we must acknowledge and learn from this significant lapse

and communication from the Navy.

EPA was informed of the exceedance on October 23rd,

far later than is acceptable.

According to Parcel C Work Plan, the Navy should have notified us

within two weeks of receiving the data in March.

This delay impaired our oversight capabilities

and has understandably shaken the community confidence

in this cleanup process.

To prevent the Navy from withholding information in the future,

we've made it clear that timely disclosure is required

under our Federal Facilities Agreement.

I've spoken with the Navy Director for the cleanup program

and have her assurances that the Navy understands

and will comply with this requirement for agency

communication of any exceedance

or unusual reading going forward.

We'll meet with the Navy, review these protocols,

and enhance accountability as well as enforceable measures

under our federal facility agreement.

The Bayview-Hunters Point community has historically

faced disproportionate environmental burdens,

We're committed to keeping you informed.

We pledge to hold the Navy accountable to the high standards

of safety and transparency.

Within the next 45 days, we aim to complete our review of the data

of the exceedance and provide a summary of our assessment.

We'll attend the January Hunters Point Citizens Advisory Committee meeting

and other public forums and endeavor to better communicate the role

that air monitoring plays in ensuring the safety of the cleanup.

We'll continue monitoring site activities closely,

especially the upcoming partial G building demolition work

and fostering transparent communication

through the cleanup process.

Thank you for your attention and your continued engagement

in this critical issue.

We're committed to working with you to ensure a safe

and transparent cleanup at Hunter's Point.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Montgomery.

Just so the public can know in basic terms

or basic terminology, what is the EPA's role

for oversight on the shipyard?

So the term CERCLA was used earlier.

That's what the Superfund program is referred to.

Under that federal law, the Navy is the lead

for the federal government for conducting the cleanup.

That law also states that the state

and US EPA are required to oversee that work.

We don't have the same amount of enforcement authority

that we would have with, say, a private party,

but we do have the ability to approve and oversee work as it applies to the cleanup.

And what was the excuse the Navy gave the EPA for the delayed notification?

I think the primary reason was that this was an anomalous piece of data.

It was hard for them to explain.

Plutonium hasn't been, even though we monitor for plutonium,

it hasn't been a radiological contaminant that we've found

or been concerned about in the past.

And the detection level was very low, that there was a distinct possibility

that it was a problem that came from the lab and not from the site.

And I think they were trying to answer that question.

But that doesn't, you know, I think from our perspective,

they still should have let us, they should have talked to us early on

because we have expertise in that area.

We have national radiological experts,

and we could have certainly helped them in their lab audit,

and we certainly could have helped them in communicating to the community

and to the county health department, you know, why, like what does this mean?

You know, I think it, unfortunately, the lack of transparency created a much bigger, you know,

concern than it would have if we'd have been engaged early on and been able to do the risk communication that is part of what we do every day.

I think what's extremely troubling is the EPA surmises that the Navy should have disclosed in March within two weeks.

The Navy feels, from statements at this hearing, that that's information that they didn't have to disclose within two weeks.

So who is correct?

Well, this is a matter of enforcement.

We're going to be engaging in a conversation with the Navy under the Federal Facilities Agreement

as to whether or not this was a lapse in compliance.

That's an important conversation for us to have.

But more importantly, we need to get a better understanding of what does it mean when the Navy says we're going to do better.

And for us, doing better is doing what they're required to do, which is within two weeks, any data, any information needs to be provided to us.

And to make that more clear within the policy, is that something that requires an act of Congress, or can EPA just say?

No, it's mostly about how we interpret the work plans that we've agreed to that fall under this federal facilities agreement.

And I mean, I think that there's, you know, this event, this unfortunate event, I think is going to trigger a conversation about having a more literal understanding as to what's required.

And is there any consequence for the Navy when they don't comply with the agreements?

That's a topic that is unfortunate. I can't talk about it. It's subject to enforcement. We're in the midst of our conversations on that.

So you can't say if there is a consequence or what the consequence is?

Our agreement allows for stipulated penalties in certain instances.

And so generically, when we're doing oversight of Department of Defense cleanups,

for certain things we're allowed to assess a penalty.

So, yeah, are there penalties in the enforcement agreements we have with the military?

There are.

Is this something that we can talk about in this particular instance?

We can't because it's an ongoing enforcement discussion.

Does that make sense?

Definitely understand.

Just want to make sure that we do everything we can for this not to happen again.

And so it is important to know, obviously, if there's mistrust, there's lack of transparency,

that the organization or the agency is held accountable.

That usually helps with things not repeating themselves.

Understood.

I don't see any questions or statements from colleagues.

Mr. Clerk, can we go to public comment on this hearing?

Thank you.

Thank you.

Yes, members of the public who wish to speak on this item should line up to speak at this time.

Each speaker will be allowed two minutes.

There will be a soft chime when you have 30 seconds left

and a louder chime when your time has expired.

If you can line up by the wall, by the windows, it would be appreciated.

Dr. Ahimsa Porter-Sumchai, founder of the Radiological Subcommittee

of the Hunter's Point Shipyard Restoration Advisory Board.

As we approach the 2026 centennial, it's important to remember that when San Francisco adopted the precautionary principle in July of 2003,

it became the first local government in the United States to do so.

The precautionary principle asked how little harm is possible.

Its central tenet argues a lack of complete scientific certainty regarding cause and effect is not sufficient.

reason to postpone measures to prevent environmental degradation

or protect public health when threats of serious or reversible damage exist.

Thus, the Navy's efforts to conceal, delay, minimize, and fraudulently distort

the plutonium-239 actionable exceedance violates the FFA agreement,

and it violates city law.

The Department of Public Health courageously shut down bathhouses in 1984 to contain the AIDS epidemic.

In 2000, the Health Department shut down the city to contain the COVID pandemic.

Da Vinci said there are three classes of people, those who see when they are shown and those who do not see.

And I am asking you to see that the source of the plutonium-239 actionable exceedance detected by downwind air monitor MSC-02 at Building 228

is east of a radiation staging yard that the Navy Inspector General's Office verified

as having been present in March of 2024.

I will submit this photo again to you.

I am calling on the city and county of San Francisco to file a federal injunction to

prohibit the Navy from operating radiation staging yards adjacent

to sensitive human receptors.

And I have served you with a judicial .

Good morning, Supervisor.

My name is .

I'm from District 10, and I'm speaking on behalf of the Navy.

I feel like you guys are a cover-up, sitting there talking about all that stuff,

and it's not good.

You keep on saying hello, and you can explain that to the community.

I'm a community member, too, and we come to the meeting,

and you're not honesty, transparent.

I don't know.

you take the integrity from the community. I don't trust you guys.

And you close everything that we talk about the meeting

and you don't have the answer for the community. And please,

when we talk about the Navy, I was there.

And very upset about it. We are not, because I hear one of the

guys come up and say, we're frustrated. No, we're not frustrated. We're alert.

Please, we're not stupid.

And please have some courtesy when you say transparent.

Please make sure to disclose this with integrity.

And thank you so much.

Thank you, Shimon.

Thank you so much.

Good morning, Supervisor Shimon and members.

My name is Joyce Armstrong, and I'm the vice chair of the Hunters Point Shipyard Citizens Advisory Committee.

And we are very disappointed in the findings of the Navy.

It appears to us that it's a cover-up.

We are calling for an independent investigation.

We think that needs to happen because, as we mentioned, this is a pattern.

we're not scientists

we're there to make sure that the community

gets the information and we get it

and we work from there

but when the

trust is gone

that makes them not trust anything

that you have to say

so we're just really disappointed

in the actions or the lack of

that the Navy took

with

not disclosing

I don't care how low

we still want to know.

So we would ask that maybe the legislature needs to be amended.

I don't know.

I just, you know, I'm here.

I'm sorry I've been sneezing and coughing and blowing all over the place,

but I knew it was important to be here this morning

because we do want you to know that we're not happy and we're dissatisfied.

and we'd like to have you clear up why you didn't report it.

If it's so low, what does it matter?

You still need to report it to us and let us be able to have the community come and find out.

So that's what we feel.

Lots more, but of course I can't say all that in this particular session,

but we are dissatisfied and we'd like to see some action.

Thank you.

Hello.

My name is Nikki Vismar, and I'm a full-time artist at Owners Point Shipyard, and I'm part

of the Shipyard Trust for the Arts.

And I want to be clear that the delays in the reporting, the radiological results, that

it is unacceptable and it undermines public trust.

So as a full-time artist, I'm on site regularly during the remediation activity.

And I do want to thank the Navy because the communication from the Navy to the artist community

has vastly improved over the last year, but communication alone does not protect people

who are physically present every day.

And I personally would like to see stronger visible dust control and containment measures

in place, such as windscreens around the excavation and the testing areas and the clearly defined

radiological screening yards.

These are standard controls that reduce risk and would demonstrate a real commitment to

to protecting the workers and the surrounding community.

And I think if the Navy agrees

to implement those kind of measures,

it would be a meaningful first step towards rebuilding trust

and showing that health and safety are being prioritized

in practice and not just in reporting.

Thank you.

Are there any additional speakers on this matter?

There are no additional speakers.

Thank you, seeing no additional speakers.

Public comment is now closed.

Vice Chair Sherrill.

Chair Walton, I just want to thank you for calling this hearing.

This entire area has been home to a community that

has not been given the attention, the resources

that they deserve.

And perhaps I am naively optimistic about the future,

but I do think there can be a brighter future,

kind of following your leadership on this.

but really can only happen starting with the transparency if we all work together on this.

We need to build trust with the community there if we're going to be able to move forward productively.

So Chair Walton, I think this is a great step.

I really appreciate you calling the hearing today.

And to the community members who showed up, thank you all for coming as well.

Thank you, Vice Chair Sherrill.

President Mendelman.

Thank you, Chair Walton.

Pretty much the same comments as our colleague.

Thanks for having this hearing.

I think there is justifiably not a lot of trust in the community, especially after the Tetra Tech fiasco.

And so I think it's really, really important that everybody be as transparent as possible and disclose as quickly as possible.

And so it just adds insult to injury.

You know, I'm not a scientist.

I don't know what this means, but it is troubling when, you know, it takes a year to get the information out.

and everybody understands that it seems like,

but this is already a community that has been done wrong,

not just over decades, but particularly around this cleanup.

And so, I don't know, it's a cliche that people need to do better,

but people need to do better.

Thank you, President Meadowman.

And I want to thank, of course, all the members of community

who came out this morning and want to thank the EPA,

Department of Public Health, Office of Community Investment,

infrastructure and I do want to thank the Navy for for showing up. We've called

hearings before in the past around issues on the shipyard and they have not

been in attendance so I do want to appreciate you for coming for owning up

to the mistake but again apologies and admissions do not protect our community.

This should not happen and we want to make sure that this does not happen.

Again, I want to also thank the Bayview Hunters Point, Ship Your Citizens Advisory Committee for all of your work.

The entire committee, Dr. Honeycutt, who's the chair, just thank you for continuing to serve, for continuing to volunteer,

and for continuing to get information out to the community because I know you have a hard job,

particularly when you have to deliver a lot of bad news for a very long time

because this is not the first issue we've had with the Navy.

It's not the first issue we've had with regulators at the site.

It's not the first issue that community has had to deal with around cleanup

and what's taking place on the shipyard.

And so I just want to appreciate the CAC for that.

And obviously, since the discovery of the plutonium levels, we've had meetings, we've talked to community.

There have been promises of changes in terms of what happens when any amount of plutonium or anything that could be harmful to community is detected.

And I want everyone to know that our office will continue to be on top of holding the Navy, holding EPA, holding Department of Public Health, everyone accountable and doing everything that we can within our authority as a member of the Board of Supervisors.

But we know the most important thing on this shipyard is 100% cleanup.

And that has to take place on the shipyard.

We also know that community participation and making sure that community gets information around anything harmful,

those are the things that are most important.

And so I want to again say that we have a long way to go for any type of trust to be built with the Navy and the community

because of incidences like this and also because of mistakes and harms that have been done in the past.

And so I do want to close this hearing, but rest assured,

I'm pretty sure that we will be having more hearings on the Navy, on the shipyard,

and on cleanup as we continue to monitor what's taking place.

So with that, I'd like to move to file this hearing.

Mr. Clerk.

Yes, I'm a motion to file this matter.

Vice Chair Sherrill.

Aye.

Sherrill, aye.

Member Mandelman.

Aye.

Mandelman, aye.

Chair Walton.

Aye.

Walton, aye.

That motion passes without objection.

Thank you.

Motion carries.

Mr. Clerk, do we have any more business this morning?

That completes the agenda for today.

Thank you.

We are adjourned.

Thank you.