Joint Oversight Hearing on NYC 911 System Outage – September 9, 2026
Joint Oversight Hearing on NYC 911 System Outage – September 9, 2026
On September 9, 2026, the New York City Council Committees on Technology, Public Safety, Fire and Emergency Management, and Governmental Operations held a joint oversight hearing to examine the seven-hour 911 system outage that occurred on August 18, 2026. The outage affected the Bronx Public Safety Answering Center 2 (PSAC 2) and left approximately 113 unique callers without service. City officials from the Office of Technology and Innovation (OTI), FDNY, and NYPD testified, and two members of the public provided testimony. The hearing focused on the root cause, response timeline, lack of public notification, redundancies, and accountability.
Public Comments & Testimony
- Jordan Rosenthal (Director of Advocacy at Community Access, leader of Correct Crisis Intervention Today coalition) advocated for a fully independent 911 system separate from the NYPD, citing best practices from Seattle and Austin. He noted that a University of Chicago Health Lab report recommends 911 centers be equal and separate from police and other agencies to improve clarity and outcomes.
- Michelle Amp Lomanville and Beverly Lonmanville (health educators and former NYU lecturer, retired technology analyst) spoke on behalf of victims of Havana syndrome and anomalous health incidents, calling for protections against technological weaponization and requesting a meeting to discuss 911 system scanning concerns.
Discussion Items
- Timeline of the Outage: OTI Commissioner Lisa Galopter detailed that at 3:13 a.m. on August 18, 2026, after a routine Motorola firewall firmware upgrade at PSAC 2, calls began failing. The issue was first reported at 6:00 a.m. by an NYPD call taker, a ticket was filed at 6:40 a.m., and the city did not determine that 911 calls were affected until 9:30 a.m. The outage was resolved by 10:19 a.m. after rerouting all traffic to PSAC 1 in Brooklyn.
- Call Impact Statistics: Of 5,489 total emergency calls during the disruption (including alarm company calls), 1,696 encountered issues. Of these, 742 were 911 calls, from 319 unique phone numbers. 206 of those callers eventually connected; 113 unique callers did not receive service. No deaths or injuries have been attributed to the outage.
- Public Notification Failure: Multiple councilmembers criticized the lack of public alert during the outage. OTI acknowledged that because they only knew 911 calls were impacted for about 45 minutes before resolution, primary focus was on remediation, but they will revisit communication protocols. A separate text-to-911 outage in May 2026 (110 minutes, 12 callers affected) also lacked public notification beyond bounce-back messages.
- Redundancy and Testing: The system has redundant architecture (PSAC 1 and PSAC 2 can each handle full volume), but the failure did not trigger automatic failover. Testing protocols failed to detect the session-timeout issue. OTI has implemented immediate manual monitoring and a freeze on new deployments pending a full root cause analysis.
- Vendor Accountability: Motorola performed the upgrade and deemed it low risk, but the city did not independently verify. OTI stated it would be premature to assign liability until the root cause analysis is complete, though Motorola is contractually subject to service-level agreements and potential remedies.
- Next-Gen 911: The city’s next-generation 911 modernization, initiated in 2020, is now expected to be completed in Q3 2027 (previously summer 2026). Commissioner Galopter committed to a disciplined review of the project.
- Staffing: NYPD testified that 911 operator staffing is a top priority; overtime currently averages 32 hours per month per operator. The goal is to reach voluntary overtime only within three to six months.
Key Outcomes
- The committees will send a joint letter requesting additional information on unresolved questions, including the root cause analysis timeline, specific caller outcomes, and Motorola’s contractual liabilities.
- OTI has instituted an immediate freeze on new system changes except critical updates, increased executive-level oversight, and daily interagency status meetings.
- A full root cause analysis is ongoing, with no set deadline; Commissioner Galopter indicated it could take months.
- The city will re-evaluate risk assessment criteria, change management procedures, and public notification policies with NYC Emergency Management (NYCEM) and the Notify NYC system.
- Independent verification of Motorola’s findings and a review of alternative vendor options were raised as future considerations.
- Councilmember Lincoln advocated for relocating the PSAC 1 facility from the Metrotech campus in downtown Brooklyn due to its negative impact on the neighborhood.
Meeting Transcript
Good morning. Welcome to today's New York City Council hearing for the Committee on Technology. Join with the Committee on Fire Emergency Management, public safety, governmental operations, state and legislation. At this time, please sign all cell phone electronic devices. Moving forward, no one is to approach today's. If you wish to testify today, please fill out an appearance card with the sergeant at arms. Chairs, we are ready to begin. Good morning and welcome to our hearing. I am Councilmember Carmen Della Rosa, and I am the chair of the Committee on Technology. I'm happy to be joined by my colleagues, Chair Ariola, Chair Felice, and Chair Brewer in holding this joint hearing on the on examining New York City New York City's 911 emergency system outage. I want to begin with the words of FDNY EMS local 2507, delivered before this council at a similar hearing. Clinical death begins after four minutes. Biological death begins after six minutes. And as local 2507 reminds us, in this modern era, emergency systems are designed to work diligently in seconds, because when a life is on the line, there is no time to waste, and every minute counts. However, in the early mornings of August 18th, for approximately seven hours, a part of New York City's 911 system failed as calls takers at the Bronx Public Safety Answering Center 2 could not hear callers. According to the New York Times, approximately 1700 calls were affected, and as many as 400 callers have not had not been connected with a 911 at all. New Yorkers were neither informed about the outage nor instructed to text 911 or call back while it was happening. Mayor Mamdani has since stated that the cost was a software update by OTI's vendor Motorola Solutions. Ironically, Motorola tells its public safety customers on its website when someone calls 911, every second counts. And if something is broken, we need to fix it and not tomorrow. We need to fix it yesterday. On August 18, New Yorkers lost not seconds but hours. The system was fixed seven hours later. Sadly, this was not an isolated warning. That October, human error caused another major disruption to FDNY's emergency dispatch system. And more recently, in 2025, staffing shortages have caused some 911 callers to hear a recorded message telling them to hold because every operator is busy. No complex system will ever be perfect. Software can fail. But 911 is not an ordinary computer system. It is the number New Yorkers call on the worst day of their lives. And we need to treat it with all of that seriousness. Today we want to learn what happened, why the public was not immediately informed, what safeguards exists and fail, what redundancy, what and what redundancy testing, staffing, and accountability are necessary to make sure that the next technological failure does not become a tragedy. Now I'd like to thank the technology committee staff, legislative council, Irene Bohovsky, and policy analyst Eric Brown, my chief of staff, James Burke, my staff, Hebaimad, and Frei Familia for putting this hearing together. None have arrived yet. So I will pass it to our oh, sorry. How could I forget our former chair? I'm sorry. Uh Councilmember Gutierrez and our Council Girl Gutierrez with us today. Um I also want to recognize and pass uh pass on for opening statements to our co-chairs. We'll start with Chair Ariola. Thank you, Chair. Good morning. I am Councilmember Joanne Ariola, and I am the chair to the Committee on Fire and Emergency Management. I want to thank my fellow colleagues, Chairs Brewer, Felice, and Delarosa for co-chairing this hearing today on the city's 911 outage that occurred last month. I also want to thank representatives of the administration and the public for attending today's hearing, as well as my fellow colleagues who are here today. As New Yorkers, we know the operation of emergency response services within a densely populated urban area is extremely challenging, and that it is when all aspects of our 911 system are functional. As was stated earlier, the August outage of our city's 911 system is highly alarming. This disruption impacted the safety of New Yorkers, not only by limiting the ability to receive emergency calls, but also to respond to these calls. It is paramount that we, as a city, provide life-saving responses to fire and medical emergencies and ensure life-saving services are promptly delivered as needed. During today's hearing, we want to learn about how both FDNY and EMS dispatch systems were impacted during the outage.
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