Joint Oversight Hearing on NYC 911 System Outage – September 9, 2026
Joint Oversight Hearing on NYC 911 System Outage – September 9, 2026
This joint oversight hearing, held by the Committees on Technology, Public Safety, Fire and Emergency Management, and Governmental Operations, State & Federal Legislation, examined the seven-hour 911 system outage that occurred on August 18, 2026. The outage, caused by a Motorola firmware update at the Bronx Public Safety Answering Center (PSAC 2), left approximately 113 unique 911 callers unable to reach emergency services. Officials from the Office of Technology and Innovation (OTI), NYPD, and FDNY testified, and council members expressed strong concerns about delayed detection, lack of public notification, and insufficient redundancy.
Public Comments & Testimony
- Jordan Rosenthal (Director of Advocacy, Community Access / Correct Crisis Intervention Today coalition) argued for an independent 911 system separate from the NYPD, citing best practices from Seattle and Austin, and a University of Chicago Health Lab report recommending equal status for emergency communication centers.
- Michelle Amp Lomanville and Beverly Lonmanville spoke on behalf of Havana syndrome victims, raising concerns about potential misuse of 911 technology and requested meetings to discuss protections.
Discussion Items
- Timeline and Detection Failures: Councilmembers highlighted that the outage began at 3:13 AM, but the first call-taker alert came around 6:00 AM, a ticket was filed at 6:40 AM, and the full scope (affecting 911 calls) was not understood until 9:30 AM. OTI Commissioner Galopter acknowledged that electronic monitoring did not catch the issue and that manual monitoring has since been instituted.
- Public Notification: Multiple councilmembers (Feliz, Ariola, Brewer, Morano, Riley) criticized the city for not notifying the public during the outage. OTI stated that once they knew 911 calls were affected (9:30 AM), the focus was on remediation, and only 45 minutes elapsed before resolution, so they chose not to deter callers. Councilmembers argued that notification should be immediate, especially given a similar texting outage in May 2026.
- Vendor Accountability: Councilmembers pressed on Motorola's role, asking why the firmware update was deemed low risk, why testing failed, and what contractual remedies exist. OTI declined to assign blame until a root cause analysis is complete but noted a freeze on new deployments and daily executive-level meetings.
- Redundancy and System Design: Questions were raised about why calls did not automatically failover from PSAC 2 (Bronx) to PSAC 1 (Brooklyn). OTI explained that the redundancy did not trigger because 70% of calls were still being handled, making the issue appear intermittent. Councilmembers called for automatic failover mechanisms.
- Staffing and Next-Gen 911: NYPD reported progress on 911 operator staffing (1,370 operators currently, up 10% from last year) and projected voluntary overtime within 3–6 months. Next-gen 911, originally slated for summer 2026, is now expected in Q3 2027; OTI committed to a disciplined review.
- Prior Outages: The hearing referenced a May 2026 texting outage (110 minutes) and a 2024 configuration error. OTI noted that the May outage affected 12 texters who received bounce-back messages.
Key Outcomes
- The hearing was filed by committee without immediate action.
- Council committees will send a follow-up letter with unanswered questions, including details on the 113 unserviced callers, Motorola's liability, and public notification protocols.
- OTI committed to completing a root cause analysis (timeline not specified) and to revisiting risk assessment criteria, change management, and public communication policies.
- NYPD committed to honoring the call-taker and principal who escalated the issue with a Commander's Day.
- No deaths or injuries were attributed to the outage based on preliminary review, but outreach to affected callers continues.
Meeting Transcript
Good morning. Welcome to today's New York City Council hearing for the Committee on Technology. Join with the Committee on Fire Emergency Management, public safety, governmental operations, state and legislation. At this time, please sign all cell phone electronic devices. Moving forward, no one is to approach today's. If you wish to testify today, please fill out an appearance card with the sergeant at arms. Chairs, we are ready to begin. Good morning and welcome to our hearing. I am Councilmember Carmen Della Rosa, and I am the chair of the Committee on Technology. I'm happy to be joined by my colleagues, Chair Ariola, Chair Felice, and Chair Brewer in holding this joint hearing on the on examining New York City New York City's 911 emergency system outage. I want to begin with the words of FDNY EMS local 2507, delivered before this council at a similar hearing. Clinical death begins after four minutes. Biological death begins after six minutes. And as local 2507 reminds us, in this modern era, emergency systems are designed to work diligently in seconds, because when a life is on the line, there is no time to waste, and every minute counts. However, in the early mornings of August 18th, for approximately seven hours, a part of New York City's 911 system failed as calls takers at the Bronx Public Safety Answering Center 2 could not hear callers. According to the New York Times, approximately 1700 calls were affected, and as many as 400 callers have not had not been connected with a 911 at all. New Yorkers were neither informed about the outage nor instructed to text 911 or call back while it was happening. Mayor Mamdani has since stated that the cost was a software update by OTI's vendor Motorola Solutions. Ironically, Motorola tells its public safety customers on its website when someone calls 911, every second counts. And if something is broken, we need to fix it and not tomorrow. We need to fix it yesterday. On August 18, New Yorkers lost not seconds but hours. The system was fixed seven hours later. Sadly, this was not an isolated warning. That October, human error caused another major disruption to FDNY's emergency dispatch system. And more recently, in 2025, staffing shortages have caused some 911 callers to hear a recorded message telling them to hold because every operator is busy. No complex system will ever be perfect. Software can fail. But 911 is not an ordinary computer system. It is the number New Yorkers call on the worst day of their lives. And we need to treat it with all of that seriousness. Today we want to learn what happened, why the public was not immediately informed, what safeguards exists and fail, what redundancy, what and what redundancy testing, staffing, and accountability are necessary to make sure that the next technological failure does not become a tragedy. Now I'd like to thank the technology committee staff, legislative council, Irene Bohovsky, and policy analyst Eric Brown, my chief of staff, James Burke, my staff, Hebaimad, and Frei Familia for putting this hearing together. None have arrived yet. So I will pass it to our oh, sorry. How could I forget our former chair? I'm sorry. Uh Councilmember Gutierrez and our Council Girl Gutierrez with us today. Um I also want to recognize and pass uh pass on for opening statements to our co-chairs. We'll start with Chair Ariola. Thank you, Chair. Good morning. I am Councilmember Joanne Ariola, and I am the chair to the Committee on Fire and Emergency Management. I want to thank my fellow colleagues, Chairs Brewer, Felice, and Delarosa for co-chairing this hearing today on the city's 911 outage that occurred last month. I also want to thank representatives of the administration and the public for attending today's hearing, as well as my fellow colleagues who are here today. As New Yorkers, we know the operation of emergency response services within a densely populated urban area is extremely challenging, and that it is when all aspects of our 911 system are functional. As was stated earlier, the August outage of our city's 911 system is highly alarming. This disruption impacted the safety of New Yorkers, not only by limiting the ability to receive emergency calls, but also to respond to these calls. It is paramount that we, as a city, provide life-saving responses to fire and medical emergencies and ensure life-saving services are promptly delivered as needed. During today's hearing, we want to learn about how both FDNY and EMS dispatch systems were impacted during the outage.
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